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Then when I speak of the other section of the
intelligible part of the line you will understand
that I mean that which reason apprehends directly
by the power of pure thought; it treats assumptions
not as principles, but as assumptions in the true
sense, that is, as starting points and steps in the
ascent to the universal, self-sufficient first
principle; when it. has reached that principle it
can again descend, by keeping to the consequences
that follow from it, to a final conclusion. The
whole procedure involves nothing in the sensible
world, but deals throughout with Forms and finishes
with Forms.
Plato's Renub lie
The world had a beginning
And this beginning could be the mother of the
wor1d .
When you know the mother
Go on to know the child.
After you have known the child
Go back to holding fast to the mother,
And to the end of your days you will not meet with
danger.
Tao Te Chinq LI I
y tU I I UN UNE t I NTNQuLiL'T 1 ON
What, then, is time? If no one ask me, I know| if I
want to explain to someone who does ask me, I do not know.
Vet I state confidently that I know this: if nothing were
passing away, there would be no past time, and if nothing
were coming, there would be no present time. How, then can
these two kinds of time, the past and the future, be, when
the past no longer is and the future as yet does not be?1
This reflection of Augustine vividly exemplifies how the
guestion of time has bewildered the human mind. The problem
of time is a question probably as old as man's
consciousness. When man asks question about beings, he is
perplexed because all beings exists in time. For as soon as
he passes judgment on being and says that something has a
property of 1x', the identity of that something will alter
in respect of time. Hence, we cannot make any 'conclusive'
assertion on anything since all our assertions, together
with what is asserted, do not correspond to the object which
changes every now and then. As a result, we would have no
knowledge about beings when everything is in perpetual flux.
That is why the guestion of time and the guestion of Being
(which concerns about the Being of beings) always go hand in
hand with each other.
Since it is impossible for us to assert the permanent
existence of beings in respect of time, we cannot determine
the BeingEssence of beings. Thus, the integrity of science
is strongly challenged if the aforementioned radical
standpoint can hold. The reason is that the possibility of
science has to presuppose the stability of its object and
the repeatability of experiment; but now the perpetual flux
of beings seems to have brought uncertainty into the
problematic of science in general. Knowledge in general will
be unfounded if the identity of its object and can never be
pinpointed by assertion. This unpleasant consequence is far
from acceptable because, if that is the case, we will not
be able to understand why we have developed our own cultus e.
It is an unquestioned fact that we are already living in a
cultural world reflecting upon our own Being.
3The question of time and of Being undoubtedly
constitute the main concern of Heidegger's thought. They
are discussed in his early writings as well as his- later
works. For Heidegger, the question of the meaning of Being
leads him to the discourse on truth as aletheia and the
latter turns out to be one of the central theme of his
writings, especially in the thirties. As early as in
Being and_Time, the notion of truth is being investigated
along with Heidegger' s formulation of a fundamental ontology
which acts as an access to the question of the meaning of
Being. As a result, the double possibility of Dasein's
manner of existence becomes the subject matter of his
exposition. But in the thirties, instead of being just one
part of the exposition of the question of Being, the
question of truth is then articulated with respect to the
so-called 'two-foldness'. The question of the meaning of
Being is now subsumed under the question of the 'truth' of
Being. Hence, Heidegger starts with a perspective different
from that of Being and Time. However, this problematic is
transfigured in his latest years when Heidegger tries- to
reformulate his problem. With the problem of the 'two-
foldness' of truth (aletheia as a-letheia), Heidegger
touches upon the issue of the 'Mystery' (of thought). The
Mystery has nothing to deal with mysticism. For Heidegger,
the Mystery is not mystical but simple. Since the Mystery
is the simplest subject matter, we easily overlook its
simplicity and treat it as the most obvious matter without
questioning it. Ihis notion will be made clear in section
three of the present paper.
In respect of the aforementioned, we may conclude that
aletheia is one of the leading notions in Heidegger's
DenAsweg. A closer examination of the notion will help us
understand his thought. The task of this present paper is
to expose Heidegger's notion of truth through some textual
analysis of his later works. At the same time, I will
combat with some misunderstanding on Heidegger's thought.
By 1 later writings' I do not mean 'later Heidegger' or
'Heidegger II'. The distinction between an early Heidegger
and a later Heidegger (or in Richardson's terms, Heidegger I
and Heidegger II), has already been questioned by Heidegger
himself. In his letter to Richardson, Heidegger makes
explicit his own reluctance to accept this demarcation. He
claims that we could at most take the differences as way-
stations of his I)enfSf«g. As a result, throughout this
paper, I will preserve the unity of Heidegger's thought by
treating these way-stations merely as the different phases
of a more or less unigue undertaking. Here, the phrase
later writing' is used to denote those mature writings
written in Heidegger's later years, namely, Identity and
Pif fSrftnce, E arly Greek Thinking, On the Way to La nquaqe,
On Time and Being and some other less major ones.
Many of the recently published Heidegger-1iterature
deal with the notion aletheia. Some of them explore the
notion in respect of Being and some relate their expositions
to the notion ' Ereigms'. These two approaches of
interpreting aletheia might go separately or they miqht
interwind without any articulation. For those who read
aletheia and Being alone may conclude that aletheia as
unconcea1 ment is the truth of Being. Unconcea1 ment is that
opening activity which lets being discloses itself, i.e.
lets being come to its Being. All existents, whether
empirical or non-empirical, have to presuppose that very
disclosive act. As a result, aletheia as discJosuie may be
treated as the condition of possibility of any presencmq as
such. On the other hand, those who make analysis upon the
relation between aletheia and Ereignis would argue that
aletheia, which is the disclosure of Being, is related to
other nations such as physis, 1 ogo'-', E r eiqn 1 and
These notions (including aletheia itself) signify
original presencing which discloses and at the
covers up itself. And hence, they may conclude
Heidegger, these notions are synonyms and speak of the same
subject matter.
Although these interpretations do not necessarily
contradict Heidegger's thought a guestion remains unanswered
by them. Even though some of Heidegger-1iterature intend to
bring these approaches into unity, they leave their
possibility of articulation unexplained. How could we
articulate these two approaches into one unifying whole?
What is the relation among Being, aletneia and Ereignis in
Heidegger's thought? How should the notion aletheia be
understood? Any interpretation which neglects these
guestions may cover up some significant. elements in
Heidegger's thought. Thus, I intend to bring forth this
seemingly insignificant issue in the present paper.
Before going into the details of Heidegger's thought, I
would like to say a few words on the structure of the
present paper. It is difficult to have an appropriate
understanding of Heidegger's thought when we first read it,
especially in his later works. His poetic language and the
paradoxical sentence structure frighten many novices. Common
analysis seldom works when applied to his text. Although
the subject matter of his thought is simple, it is difficult
to apprehend as well as to express in our everyday
1anguage.
The present paper is divided into four sections. In
the first section the task and the structure of the paper
are explained. In section two the question of the essence
of truth is discussed. Within this context, I will start
with Heidegger's critique of the traditional conception of
Truth. With the help of his criticism, we may obtain a pre-
understandinq of his notion of truth. Then, I will
explicate the meaning of aletheia in Heidegger's later
writings by textural analysis. Section three is devoted to
the exposition of 'Lichtung' and 'Ereignis', two leading
notions in Heidegger's later writings closely related with
aletheia. They will be analyzed in different perspectives
in the hope of making easier our understanding on the
subject matter of Heidegger's thought. Then both of these
notions will be assimilated to constitute the full
signification of aletheia as EreignisLichtung. Section
four concludes the present paper. After the exposition of
the notion of truth in Heidegger's thought, the problem as
regards the finitude of man will be resumed, which is a
theme of increasing importance since its implicit
formulation in Being and Tjlme .
I do my utmost to attain emptiness;
I hold my utmost to stillness.
The myriad creatures all rise together
And I watch their return.
The teeming creatures
All return to their separate roots.
Returning to one's roots is known as stillness.
This is what is meant by returning to one's destiny.
T a o Te China XVI
SECTION TWO: ON THE WAY TO TRUTH
Chapter One: Traditiona1 Conception of Truth
For two thousand years, thinkers and philosophers have
been trying to save our world from disorder, and they
propose various theories of Truth to explain away
illusion. These attempts can be summarized into two
epistemo1ogica1 models. They either adopt correspondence
theory of Truth (which is mostly found in Realism) or
coherence theory of I ruth (which is mostly found in
Idealism). But are they the sole models to keep our world
under measure or is there a third way? Martin Heidegger,
who reflects upon the ground of metaphysics, allows us to
see the third way. Before going into the details or
Heidegger's notion of truth as documented in his later
works, we have to start with a brief exposition of the
the traditional conceptions of Truth.
a. Cor resDondence thpnrv nf Tr-iit-h
Two versions of correspondence theory of Truth can be
found in the history of philosophy. The older formulation
proclaims that every proposition which talks about the world
is correlated with atomic fact. As a result, a proposition
is true, if and only if it can be verified by fact.
Empiricist calls this kind of Truth 'true by fact'. Thus,
we will have propositions on the one side and the world
(atomic facts) as their correlates on the other. However,
the discrepancy between atomic propositions and the world
gives rise to a difficult issue.
If we assert the truth-value of a proposition, the
correspondence between proposition and facts is understood
in accordance with another act which is reflective in
nature. This reflective act is different from the
observationa1 act (i.e. perception) which constitutes the
I
relation of correspondence. If we insist that this
reflective act corresponds with the former correlated poles
i
(i.e. the atomic proposition and the atomic fact), then we
are confronting the following difficulties. We admit either
infinite regress or the derivative sense of correspondence
theory of Truth which is based on a synthetic act (i.e.
ref1ection) .
1o encounter this paradox, A. Tarski suggests a new
formulation of correspondence theory, that is, the Semantic
Theory of Truth. He puts it into one proposition:
The sentence snow is white is true if, and only
if, snow is white.
Making use of the distinction between 'to mention' and
'to use', Tarski, at first sight, seems to have solved the
difficulties that we have just proposed. However, it remains
a failure if Tarski intends to convey any truth-claim with
his definition which belongs to the set of propositions. It
is justifiable for us to ask for the justification of the
definition if it is a proposition. Therefore, he must
either retain the paradox of correspondence theory or ask
for help from coherence theory which makes it possible for
him to take the definition as self-contained.
b. Coherence Theory of Truth
In order to explicate coherence theory of Truth, I will
take private-1anguage argument as an example.
Those who propose that there is private-1anguage argue
in two different ways: 1 e pis tern ic privacy and r 2 p? ivacy
of ownership. The former falls into the discourse of
epistemology. They argue that only the speaker car? know, or
does know with a greater certainty whether he is in pain.
The latter belongs to the discourse of ontology and claims
that only the owner can have his own pain. As a result, any
language which refers (inwardly) to the owner's experience
should be private (i.e. that experience can not be shared).
If there is private language, then we can pass a judgment
(in proposition) with no one can understand except the
speaker as well as the knowerowner alone. The validity of
private judgment does not presuppose an object which exists
independent of the judgment since there is no common
referent for each private-language system. It is rather
grounded on the 'grammar' of which the language system
works. A judgment is true if, and only if, it is formulated
in accordance with the 'grammar'. For instance, it is
perfectly right to say I know I am in pain but we cannot
say something like I know you are in pain. Ihe latter
use violates the 'grammar' of I know' (i.e. inconsistent
with the 'grammar') and hence, we may conclude that
consistency is the essence of coherence theory of Truth.
If plurality of 'grammar' (or plurality of language-
games) is accepted, coherence theory cannot settle the
dispute on their validity-claim. When all of the 'grammar ,
which are self-consistent in themselves, assert
simultaneously the same subject matter with different
results, how can we verify their validity-claim ? We are
facing the threat of falling into relativism which is
either in the form of absolutism or nihilism on the one
hand or we have to abandon the theory on the other. It is a
relative absolutism if we maintain that each validity-claim
is grounded in its own 'grammar' and then there will be
more than one Truth. This would mean the same thing as
absence of absolute truth. It is a relative nihilism if
each of their claims is regarded as indeterminab1e, then
there would be no ultimate criterion for validity-claim.
These two points of view, although different in their
conseguences, remain within the bound of coherence theory.
Can we accept a theory with these consequences as our
guiding principle which says no more than this: do what you
want to do since everyone is right or no one can tell you
the right way? Certainly not. It is intolerable to live
in a world in which any order is possibly its order. This
means no order. In order to 9 rid 01 dis—order,
philosophy of science seems to be our last resort.
The concept of 'theoretical power', which is introduced
by philosophy of science, may be of help. We can determine
the validity-claim of each 'grammar' by comparing their
theoretical power, i.e. the explanatory and predicting power
of a theory over the raw (observationa1) data. fhese raw
data are objective reality which exist prior to the theory.
In other words, the possibility of any explanatory theory
has to presuppose their existence. However, we have
committed a methodological fallacy if we accept the above
mentioned method as the criterion. In the beginning we
intend to determine the validity of a given theory but our
method has already presupposed an object as the determining
factor without examining its objectivity. As a result, by
comparing the theoretical power of the two models, we admit
either the vaildity of correspondence theory as the ultimate
criterion or the failure of coherence theory. What a
paradoxWe have to explain cor respondence theory in terms
of coherence theory, and vice versa.
As the clue to the relation between Heidegger and the
traditional conception of Truth, we have to introduce two
forms of coherence theory which differ merely in
perspective. The first formulation, which is originated
from Aristotelian logic, pertains to the cohesion between
the subject and the predicate in a sentence. The other one
concerns the cohesion between knowledge in the form of
proposition on the one hand and object of knowledge on the
other. Both of them are related to sentence (proposition).
While the former is based on intra-propositiona1 analysis,
the latter is based on inter-propositiona1 analysis. In
other words, we are dealing here with a proposition — fact'
structure. 1 his structure which implicitly criticizes the
foundationalism as well as subjectivism gives me a hint to
enter into Heidegger's critique of the traditional
conception of Truth.
Chapter T wo : Heideqqer's Critique of Traditional Conception
of Truth
Heidegger never argues against the validity of the
traditional conception of Truth in the above manner. Their
quarrels remain within the discourse of metaphysics which
is specifically, an epistemo1ogy. For Heidegger,
correspondence theory and coherence theory are the same.
Let us see how Heidegger explains this sameness.
As we have shown, correspondence theory depends on
the correlation between (observationa1) proposition and
fact, whereas coherence theory depends on intra— or inter—
propositiona1 analysis. Hence, we may claim that they are
based on the so-called (propositiona1 truth'. By the term
'propositional truth', I do not mean that there is some kind
of truth which is 'un-propositional . hor Heideqye; ,
propositiona1 truth is used to name the 'locus of truth .
This trend of thought can also be found in Heidegger s
later works. In the essay On the Way to Language
Heidegger elaborates the conception of language in
Aristotle's On Interpretation:
Now, what (takes places) in the making of vocal
sounds is a show of what is there in the soul in
the way of passions and what is written is a show
of the vocal sounds. And just as writing is not
the same among all (men), so also the vocal sounds
are not the same. On the other hand, those things
of which these (sounds and writings) are a show in
the first place, are among ail (men) the same
passions of the soul, and the matters of which
these (the passions) give likening representations
are also the same. (IaIL.114)
Heidegger calls this a classical architectonic structure.
It states the linear relationship of writings (letters),
vocal sounds, passions in the soul and the matters.
The letters represent the sounds which, in turn, represent
the passions in the soul (i.e. thought) which is the same
for all men and is affected outward!y by the same matter.
Although Aristotle has distinguished an outer and an inner-
space, his conception of language is different from that of
modern philosophy. Heidegger argues that Aristotle
conceives the whole process in relation to showing . As a
result, Heidegger can explain semeia (that which shows),
ymdo 1 a (that which holds to each other), and rlornoioms. ta
(that which likens) consistently in terms of showing, in the
sense of bring about the appearance, which consists in the
prevalence of unconcea1 ment (a1etheia) .3 But this kinship
o-f ' showing with what it shows cannot be made explicit now
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because the explication will immediately take us to the core
of the notion of truth in Heidegger's later work through the
notion of language as Showing. I will discuss the essence of
language in details in the next section.
In modern philosophy, Heidegger argues that the meaning
of sign has been changed. They do not understand a sign as
something which shows but as something which designates. A
sign is being used to designate a thing other than itself.
This transformation is rooted in the change of the nature of
Truth. The essence of Truth changes from 'truth as showing`
to 'Truth as designating'. This transformation gives us an
impression that language, including writings and sounds, is
a means to express our thought which is being affected by
outward objects. Simultaneously, Truth is the agreement of
the sign and the designated. There can be two types of
agreement: agreement in affection (empiricism) and the
agreement in convention (rationalism). The former is the
agreement between the matter and passions in the soul. Our
thought is true if, and only if, it agrees with the matter
which affects us. The latter is the agreement between the
passions and the language which, in turn, posseses an inner
structure of agreement between letters and sounds. Hence no
matter what kind of agreement is at work, language goes hand
in hand with I ruth. As a result, language, whether in the
form of written signs or speaking, is the 'locus' of Truth.
This is why man is understood as rational animal who
possesses reason and speech.
Therefore, correspondence theory and coherence theory
of I ruth are on the same level of meaning to Heidegger
because they mean no more than this: our knowledge, together
with our language, must refer to something which exists
independent of our knowledge, (i.e. Object, Qbjkt) or is
subjected to the rules (grammar) of our constitution, (i.e.
object, SfsgenBtana') . Although these two points of view are
quite different s they are founded on the base of
propositiona1 truth. Does Heidegger's proposal necessarily
contradict with the two aformentioned proposals? Does
Heidegger merely suggest another theory of Truth to replace
the previous two? What is the relation between Heidegger's
notion of truth and the traditional conception of Truth? We
will let Heidegger speak for himself from the beginning or
his Db n k .3 we? g.
Heidegger never rejects the validity of correspondence
theory or coherence theory, if rejection means abandon and
replacement.4 He does not treat science (a paradigmatic
application of propositiona1 truth) as mere illusion. How
can an illusion has an effect? This is why in section 44 of
ggin_g and Time Heidegger proclaims that his task is to take
its departure from the traditional conception of truth.5
This departure is by laying bare t he on to1ogica1 foundations
of that traditional conception of truth so that the
primordial phenomenon of truth becomes visible. In Kantian
terminology, Heidegger is going to state the condition of
possibility of the traditional conception of Truth. This is
the task of fundamental ontology to ground the traditional
conception of Truth on Dasein's temporality. With the help
of 1 primordial-derivative' model, he can argue that
propositions (judgments) are not the locus of truth. Hence,
Heidegger can establish the possibility of science by
placing it back to its own ground without denying its
In Being and Time Heidegger initiates his analysis by
the explication of the essence of 'assertionjudgment' which
acts as a preparation for the problem of Truth. He defines
assertion as follows:
'assertion' is 'a pointing-out which gives
something a definite character and which
communicates.' (BF199)
Three modes of signification of assertion can be obtained.
They are: 1 a pointing-out, 2 a giving which gives
something a definite character and 3 communication. What
is asserted should be able to communicate with others. The
object which is being discussed should first possess a
definite character, otherwise, we can say nothing about
it. In short, what is asserted is objective. However, the
condition of possibility of these significations is based on
the act of pointing-out'. Only when we are pointing at
something can that something possesses a definite character
and turns into a thing. Although the act of pointing can be
treated as the primary signification of assertion, this is
not the primordial phenomenon of truth. A few lines below
the definition, Heidegger announces that,
The pointing-out which assertion does is performed
on the basis of what has already been disclosed in
understanding or discovered circumspective1y.
(BT199)
For Heidegger, assertion as the derivative mode of
interpretation is grounded on a circumspective
understanding. Assertion (theoretical andor a-theoretica1)
is made possible only when the essence of Dasein is car e.
Within the concernful vision of Dasein, that which is
existed ( Heidegger calls this being present at hand ) i —1
gathered together forming the existential horizon of Dasein
in the form of something useful (i.e. being-ready-at-hand).
The computer that stands before me is a being-present-at-
hand. It is merely there and has no specific relation with
me. When I use it, the computer immediately becomes a
being ready at hand. The computer becomes a tool for me
even though I might use it improperly. I may have no ideas
about the computer, i.e. I may have no knowledge with it.
All 1 have got may be just some lo'-sas (in the ordinary
sense). For instance, I may have the following ideas: 'I
can finish my correction easily with a computer,' andor
'computer is very expensive,' andor I need someone to
teach me how to use it.' These ideas may be articulated
forming a signification whole. Heidegger calls this kind of
pre-theoretica1 understanding a pre-understanding. As a
result, he can argue that when an assertion is made, some
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fore-conception is always implied.
n the one hand, an assertion grounded on pre-
unders tand ing gives a definite character to beings. On the
other hand, through Dasein's concernful vision, beings are
understood as useful tools for Dasein. Both assertive
understanding and pre—understanding lie on the structure of
seeing ... as'. Heidegger distinguishes the structure with
two categories of 'as-structure'. They are the
1apophantical as' of the assertion and the existential-
hermeneutica1 as' of a circumspective understanding. I he
apophantical as' is grounded on the 'hermeneutical as . By
our pointing which gives being its definite character,
being r eady to hand is covered up. This structure of
seeing . . . as will re-appear as a mam theme in
Heidegger's later writings with different perspective. 1
will return to this later in the present paper.
For Heidegger, propositiona1 truth is derivative, and
hence, the essence of truth should not be founded on the
agreement of the judgment and the object because it
presupposes the validity of subject-objectObject dichotomy.
As a result, truth can never be seen as the sheer relation
of the related poles.
Chapter Three: Heidegger's Notion of Truth as aletheia
a. Definition of truth in Being and Time : The Double Possi-
b1ities
In Being and Time and his early writings, Heidegger
intends to lay the foundation of truth on the basis of an
existential-ontological (hermeneutica1) phenomenon of truth.
He characterizes the traditional conception of Truth under
three theses: 1 the locus' of truth is assertion
(j udgmen t) ; and 2) the essence of truth lies in trie
'agreement' of the judgment with its object; and 3
Aristotle, the father of logic, not only has assigned truth
to the j udgmen t as its primordial locus but has set going
8
the definition of truth as 'agreement'.' Equating
i n g true with Being uncovpr inQ with rGspec t of
Aristotle, Heidegger understands truth as a 'self-showing
which shows itself in itself' and so beings, seinden, are
taking out of their hiddenness and letting themselves be
seen in their unhiddenness. They must be discovered (Being-
uncovered) . They are not found as they are in themselves
alone but as beings among other beings. Heidegger calls
their self-showing truth in secondary sense. Their showing
has no relation with judgment and so it is 'not yet' related
to truth as 'agreement'. It is rather the ground of 'truth
as agreement' since it is the original appearance which is
the condition of possibility of the existence of object or
Object as such. On the other hand, the uncovered beings
presuppose an uncovering act which discovers beings, so
Heidegger may argue that the primordial sense of truth is
understood as the act of uncovering instead of what is being
uncovered.9 This sense of 'discoverness' can never be
carried out except by a particular being who has an on tico-
ontological priority over other beings. This particular
being is Dasein. Hence, it is possible for fundamental
ontology to seek for the foundation of truth with the
existentia 1-onto 1ogica 1 structure of Dasein.
Since the uncoveredness of beings within the wot Id
presupposes the existence of world, the world toqethti w.i th
beings are discovered. Heidegger does not take 4 the world'
epistemo1ogica 11y but sees it as the environment in
accordance with our circumspective concern (i.e.
understanding). A stone will have no idea of the world. It
is only Dasein whose essential character is 'care' and care
about his own Being that can have the idea of the world.
And so, this disc1osedness which is constituted by state-of-
mind, understanding and discourse is the basic character of
Dasein according to that which it is its 'there' (da).
Hence, Heidegger argues that Dasein's disc1osedness is the
most primordial phenomenon of truth we can achieve. So far
as the disc1osedness of Dasein's own most Being belongs to
its existential constitution we may say that Dasein is in
the truth.Heidegger keeps warning us that the
expression should not be understood as Dasein is in
possession of all truths. Dasein can never be understood as
the Cartesian ego which is the ground of certainty. the
expression means the same as Dasein, whose state — of — Being is
disc1osedness, is in a position to disclose beings in their
Being letting beings appear to us in themselves and as
themse1ves.
Since disc1osedness belongs essentially to Dasein's
character, Dasein possesses the ontico-ontological priority
over other beings in respect of the question of Being. As a
result, Dasein is in a particular position to bring other
being into their Being (i.e. existence) in accordance with
Dasein's circumspective concern (care). Hence, Heidegger
argues that Dasein is transcendence means that Dasein can
S C 3 7G' O C of itself. Transcendence, for Heidegger, has
nothing to do with the determination of abject. or Object.
By exploring the double meaning of the notion transcendence
in Kant's work, Heidegger proclaims that he is following the
second usage.1' Primarily, transcendence deals with
Dasein's state of Being. Only if Dasein is transcendence
can disc1osedness, thrownness, projection and falling
constitute Dasein's state of Being. Dasein discovers itself
aJ ready in a definite world and is alongside with a definite
range of beings within the world. This 'already in and
alongside with ' is the disc1osedness of Dasein in the name
of care-structure.' Dasein is being thrown in the world as
being among beings.
Although Dasein is being thrown, he is free to make his
own choice. He can live inauthentica11y or authentically.
Dasein as being which understands can understand itself
either in terms of the '.world' or the 'others' on the one
hand, or in terms of its ownmost potentia 1ity-for-Being on
the other. When Dasein is authentic, projection belongs to
Dasein's state of Being. By projection, Heidegger does not
mean a mere hope. It is a planning in respect of the
Dasein's ownmost future. When Dasein discloses itself as
being—in-the—worId, Dasein discloses itself to itself in and
as its ownmost potentiality — for Being (i.e. Dasein discloses
its ownmost possibility). In other words, Dasein is a self-
showing which shows itself in itself (or which discloses
itself to itself). As a result, this authentic
disc1osedness shows the phenomenon of the most primordial
truth in the mode of authen ticity. Hence, the expression
'Dasein is in the truth' means the same as 'Dasein is in
authenticity.
Although disc1osedness constitutes Dasein's state of
Being, Dasein may disclose itself to itself inauthentica11y.
In the mode of inauthenticity we will say that Dasein is in
its falling which belongs to Dasein's state of Being. In
its falling, Dasein is being covered up through a disguised
disclosedness of its ownmost Being. As early as in
Being and Time Heidegger proclaims that there are two kinds
of Dasein's covering up: 1 Dasein is disguised by
semblance and appearance, and represents to itself these
disguised phenomena as realandor 2 Dasein loses
14
itself in its 'world', or is absorped by the they'.
Dasein represents to itself the public opinions (such as
everyone or we ...,) as its measurement without
examining the validity of these opinions. Dasein loses
itself in the 'they' and covered up itself. Hence,
Heidegger claim that,
Because Dasein is essentially falling, its state of
Being is such that it is in 'untruth'. (BT264)
As a result, we may claim that the expression Dasein
is in untruth' means the same as 'Dasein is in the
inauthen ticity' . To thematize the relation between truth and
authenticity, I call it 'authentic - truth' structure.
(This structure recalls our memory of the thesis of Greek
Ontology: What is real is true). Heidegger gets help from
Parmenides' fragments in which a distinction of 'the way to
truth' and 'the way to opinion' is made. This distinction
which states that man can live in truth or in error makes it
possible for him to argue that Dasein can live either
1 b
authentica 11y or inauthen tica 11y. ' It is the facticity of
Dasein that the expression 'Dasein is in the truth states
equiprimordia 11y as 'Dasein is in untruth' .
When Dasein is in untruth or he is inauthentic, it
takes being as something repeatable and calculable.Fhe
derivative sense of Truth comes to rule when Dasein is
pointing at something, asserting a definite character of
that thing in his communication. As a result, iruth is
allocated with assertion. I he assertion is true or correct
if, and only if, the meaning of assertion agrees with the
asserted object (either in the form of Object or object).
Hence, J u t h as agreement (in the form of prapositionai
truth) is merely the derivative sense of truth which has
already presupposed the d1sc1osedness of Dasein who can
disclose itself to itself either in an authentic or
inauthentic way. Only if Dasein is in a mode of
inauthen ticity, would it treat Truth (as agreement) as the
most primordial phenomenon of truth. It has forgotten the
authentic truth which is the most primordial phenomenon of
truth.7
b . Try t h as _Twof o 1 d
i. Ek-sistence and Truth as Unconcea1ment
Although Heidegger notices the privative sense of
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aletheia as a—letheia in Being and Lime, he takes
fundamental ontology as the access to the guestion of Being
and interprets the most primordial phenomenon of truth in
terms of the existentia 1-on to1ogica 1 structure of Dasein.
It is not until the thirties that Heidegger for the first
time introduces the notion twofoldness of truth. And at
the same time, he further augments, explicitly, his critique
of 'subject-object' dichotomy which is an issue implicitly
found in Being and Time.
In The Essence of Truth Heidegger furthers his
critigue on propositiona1 truth because he notices the
hiddened crisis of modern subjectivism within the
correspondence theory of Truth.19 He argues that
correspondence theory of Truth is of two forms. Truth is
understood either as the adequation of intellect and thinq
or as the adequation of thing to intellect. During
Scholasticism, the threat of an all embracing human subject
does not come forth. Under the conception of creation, man
is condemned to be finite. Nan is created by his Creator.
As a result, no matter in whatever manner or in whatever
mode the intellect may agree with thinq, the agreement has
to presuppose a divine mind (inteiIectus o ivinus) who keeps
every relation in perfect harmony. This is why Truth as
ao'aequa t io re i ( c reano'ae ) ao' i n te I i ec t um (o i vi nam )
guarantees Truth as a da e g ua t 2. o n 2. n t e i 1 e c r. us (f? LiffiB n 2. ) a no
, • , n20
rem (creacam).
The rise of modern philosophy in the form of
epistemology transforms the nature of Truth. [ruth as
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correctness changes into Truth as certainty. This
transformation, at the same time, resulted in the emergence
of modern subjectivism in the form of a worldly reason.
In The Essence of Truth Heidegger says:
The theologically conceived order of creation is
rsplaced by the capacity of all objects .o be
planned by means of a worldly reason which supplies
the law for itself and thus also claims that its
procedure is immediately intelligible (what is
considered logical). (BW121)
When logic comes to rule, everything can be explained
(given an account of, logos) by human reason alone. Nothing
is without why . The existence of God is not necessarily
presupposed by man in order to provide an explanation.
Reason and Faith are differentiated. This worldly reason is
self-evident and it leaves no room for the divine mind and
his creation as the foundation of all truth. Since man is
the executive agent of the worldly reason, human intellect
or will is enhanced to the level of divine mind. Through
his reflective power or his reason, man gains knowledge of
himself. This kind of knowledge , that is, self-knowledge
which is obtained through se1f-consciousness, is granted the
greatest certitude. From this kind of knowledge all other
forms of knowledge is to be deduced. I he emergence of self-
knowledge (self-certainty) concurs historically with the
rise of epistemology as the predominant field in
philosophy.22 As a result, Truth is understood as
'adequation of thing to intellect'. The thing is the
representation ( da s vo ry:S t. e 1 i z ) and the intel ietl i r-A
representing subject ( fas yc y i 1 Et hje iji.jj e.k z. ) . Hence ,
things receive their objective reality through the
representing power of human subject and become his
represen tations. The world is my representation, and
man becomes a demiurge. Man becomes his own god and the god
of others. Man cuts himself off from his origin as it is
argued by Heidegger. He forgets his homeland (die Heimt) .
The world which is planned according to the worldly reason
is being up-lifted from the ground (Baden), because man is
homeless. He does not stand with his feet on ground which
gives him nutrition. In this way,
Truth [as correctness] is here driven back to the
subjectivity of human subject. Even if an
objectivity is also accessible to this subject,
still such objectivity remains along with
subjectivity something human and at man's disposal.
(BW126)
At man's disposal means man is set free from the
divine mind and he is free to make his own choice. Since
man is set free from the constraint of divinity, he takes up
all his own responsibi1ity. Giving his own response to
stimulation, man may incline to this or that direction.
This is human freedom because man may choose nis own way of
living. Only if man is allowed to choose, can beings
manifest with a definite character (Essence, essentia)
together with a definite range of beings. Hence,
correspondence theory of Truth is driven back to the
subjectivity of human subject and is grounded on human
freedom. So we might say that the essence of truth is
freedom (human freedom).
However, Heidegger denies that the essence of truth can
be founded on the correspondence between human intellect and
things (objects) though he will agree that freedom is the
essence of truth. For Heidegger, the essence of truth
should be that which makes the correspondence possible.
Since all manifested beings possess postures, these postures
presuppose the place of gathering. Heidegger calls this
gathering place the world' in Being and Time and later, it
is called t he a pe n re? q i a n . All beings which are opened up
presuppose an open region which prevails and binds every
presencing in an original emergence which, in turn, allows
beings be what they are. Therefore, correspondence theory
of Truth which is grounded on human freedom is made possible
only on the condition that disc1osedness is Casein's state
of Being. Dasein is that particular being among all beings
which is opened in the open region and discloses to itself
an open region. Heidegger calls the open region the more
original essence of uniguely essential truth. Han is first
given to his choice (human freedom) something possible and
primordial on condition that human freedom is, in tutn ,
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being given by the open region.
If freedom is not to be understood as human choice,
what then is the essence of freedom. Up to the very moment,
can at most claim that freedom is the ground of the inner
possibility of correctness. Beings are opened up as the
correlated of propositions (i.e. the asserted object). The
opened beings are brought forth in the open region and the
letting' which lets beings appear in the open region is
called freedom in Heidegger's sense. Hence, Heidegger can
say that the essence of freedom is the 'letting-be' (or
letting beings be').
The letting-be' does not carry a negative meaning as
neglect or indifference. It also cannot be understood as
mere managing of beings, such as calculation. Freedom in
the sense of 'letting beings be' is the activity which lets
beings show themselves in themselves wit hi out any
interference. In Heidegger s own words, freedom means to
engage oneself with the o p c? n region and its openness into
which every being comes to stand, and brings t hat. openness
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along with itself.
As a result, for Heidegger, man is not a transcendenta1
subject which determines the objectivity of his objects.
Man as Dasein is the 'place' (the 'there', da) where all
beings articulate their Being in that open region. The open
regions as beings as a whole may be called the world in
its transcendental sense. In this respect, Dasein, whose
character is disclosedness, is transendence. Freedom is
engaged in the disclosing of being as such and this
disclosedness is the basic character of Dasein and it
distinguishes Dasein from other beings among the world by
the fact that Dasein will care about its own Being. Thus,
Heidegger introduces a new word 'ek-sistence' to distinguish
the existence of Dasein from the existence (existontia) of
other beings. tracing back to the stem of the word
Heidegger argues that the original meaning of the word is
dymanic. It means in the first place a stepping out of
oneself. In The Way Back to the Ground of Metaphysics
Heidegger explains:
In Being and Time the term existence is used
exclusively for the being of man. Once 'existence'
understood rightly, the 'essence' of being there
can be recalled: in its openness, ... What does
'existence' mean in Being and Time ? 'he word
designates a mode of Being; specially, the Being of
those beings who stand open for the openness of
Being in which they stand, by standing it ....
'Standing it' experienced in this manner [care], is
the essence of the ks t.as is which must be grasped
by thought. ... the 'out' ought to be understood
in terms of the openness of Being itself. f he
stasis of the ecstatic consists ... in standing in
the 'out' and 'there' of unconcea1edness in which
Being itself is present. (BW213-4)
The word loses its primordial signification when we
translate the word as osBonti which signifies a non—dymanic
(static) meaning. Hence the ek-sistence of Dasein is
different from the existence of beings within the world.
Ek-sistence, freedom as well as disclosedness, belong to
Dasein essntii 1 y. An angel, a dog or a rock does not ek-
sist. So they have no history. It is man alone who ek-sists
and possesses history. Only man who can stand outside of
himself will care about his own Being. They ask guestions,
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and at the same time, they answer. Here, we can sense the
continuity of Heidegger's notion of man which can be found
in Being and Time and that of his writings in the thirties.
This conception does not necessarily contradict with his
lastest works though his discourse is shifted to the side of
Being. I will return to this later.
Heidegger depicts that human choice does not have
freedom at its disposal. The case is rather that freedom,
ek-sistent, disclosive Da-sein, possesses man [human
freedom],but not vice versa. As we have already shown
that the essence of freedom is a letting — be which lets
beings be what they are in an open region, it is related
to the disclosure of beings as such. Since Dasein is that
particular being who cares about the Being of his own being,
disclosedness in the form of care is the existential-
ontological structure of Dasein's state of Being. When
Dasein discloses itself to itself instead of losing itself
in the world of the 'they', Dasein remains authentic (or
Dasein ek-sists). For Heidegger, Being needs man in order to
come into Being. Han is the 'place' (da) for the
manifestation of beings in their own Being. As a result, we
may conclude that by possession, Heidegger does not mean
something is in possession of another thing. The case is
rather that man is free the same time he ek-sists and
discloses. Han is in the manner of ek-sistence.
The ek-sistent man, who cares about his own Being and
is the da for the truth of Being (sain), discovers that he
is living within a tradition in which something crystallized
is handed down to him through language. So man is
'historical' and at the same time remains authentic. His
authenticity is preserved by disclosing his essential
possibility, i.e. to let beings be the beings they are and
to disclose beings as a whole. Because the essence of truth
is freedom,
Historical man can, in letting beings be; also not
let beings be the beings which they are ana as they
are. The beings are covered up and distorted.
Semblance comes to power „ In it the nwn-essPHi-e of
truth comes to the fore. (BW130)
Han can be authentic or inauthentic. Inauthentisity is not
explained in the sense of human incapacity andor negligence
but as one of the essential possibilities of Da-sein.
The do u. b i e pas s i b i I i t2. es (i.e. authenticity or
inauthen ticity) belong essentially to Dasein so we may say
that being ek-sistent, Dasem is insistent.27 Dasein is
insistent when semblance comes to power. Man forgets beings
as a whole (i.e. Being) in the face of what is available and
always accessible, i.e. beings — ready — at — hand. in that case,
man hold[s] fast to what is offered by beings, as if they
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were open of and in themselves. Since the essence of
truth is the disc1osedness of beings as a whole, i.e.
letting beings be the beings, the not-letting beings be' is
the non-essence of truth. Heidegger explains the meaning of
the word 'non-essence as follows:
Here non-essence does not yet have the sense of
inferiority to essence in the sense of what is
general (koinon, genos), its possibility and the
ground of its possibility. Non-essence is here
what in such a sense would be a pro-essential
essence. But 'non-essence' means at first and for
the most part the deformation of that already
inferior essence. indeed in each of the? so
siqnifications tho nan essence nomains a1ways in
its own way ossontial to tho essence and never
bocomos inessential in tho sonso of irrelevant.
(BW133)
In other words, truth in its essence is n. i ? truth. Hence, we
may say that the double possibilities (understood in term of
authenticity and inauthen ticity, ek-sistence and insistence,
and finally, truth and untruth) belong together. Untruth
is derived from the essence of truth, whereas the essence of
truth is to stand out of un-truth which is its core.
Un-truth as concealment preserves what is most proper to
aletheia as its own.29 The concealment of beings
as a whole is prior to the openedness of this or that being.
It is also prior to the lettinq-be which in its disclosing
already holds itself from showing and comports itself
towards concealing. Derivative sense of truth is made
possible on the condition that truth and un-truth (i.e.
unconcea1ment and concealment) belong together in their
essence. This is the reason why Heidegger can understand
truth (aletheia) as unconealment which lets beings be in
their Being (urrconcea1s) and at the same time conceals.
The understanding of aletheia as unconcea1 ment means to
think of the disc1osedness and disclosure of beings. The
disc1osedness of being as a whole does not identical with
the sum of all beings and beings as a whole is not a being.
Beings as a whole can never be calculated or comprehended.
If beings as a whole is treated as inca 1cuIabe1e and
imcamprehensib1e under the technological point of view, it
is concealed1 When letting-be is that activity which lets
beings be in a particular comportment and is related to them
by disclosing them, letting-be is intrinsically a
concealing. Hence, unconcea1ment as letting beings be is at
the same time a concealment. Heidegger gives us a metaphor
to reflect upon this relationship, that is, concealment is
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at the heart of unconcea1 ment.w This twofoldness of truth
(unconcealment and concealment) remains a dominant theme in
Heidegger's later works.
i i • A1 e theia as A — 1 etheia
In the essay Aletheia (Heraclitus, Fragment 16)
Heidegqer qives an interpretation of Fraqment 123 of
Herac1itus:
The essence of things [Dhys2.s] likes to hide.
(EGT113)
Before analyzing this famous saying, Heidegger first
considers another fragment (Fragment 16) which paved the
way of his later discussion. This Fragment of Heraclitus
goes like this:
How can one hide himself before that which never
sets? (EGT104)
Here, Heraclitus speaks of the never-setting. The word
(setting' means the same as 1 going into concealment' . We say
the sun is setting when the sun goes down the horizon.
Then 1 never-setting' means never going into concealment' .
This has the same meaning as 1 ever-rising' , or the not
setting ever.33 Therefore, Heidegger argues that
Heraclitus' notion the never—going-inta-concea1 ment' (un-
concea1 ment) is made possible only when it is thought within
the domain of concealment. In every unconcea1ment a
concealment prevails. Hence, it is possible for Heidegger
to claim that the expression 4 the not setting ever means
both revealing and, at the same time, concealing. They are
not a mere jamming of two different occurrences, but as one
and the same 34 It happens because self-concealing,
concealment (letne), belongs to aletheia, not just as an
addition, not as shadow to light, but rather as the neart of
a 1etheia.
The guestion remains: How can this 'one and the same'be
thought. Fragment 12c gives us the answer. Hhysis as rising
which turns away from something that is concealed is an un-
concealing. However, in its un-concealing, physis is seen
as something persisting in itself and is disconnected with
i e t be . S o p h ys i s is at the same time a self-concealing.
Heidegger augments that physis (self-revealing) and self-
concealing (they are placed side by side in the fragment)
are related by the verb oiiiiei which shows the way in
which rising occurs essentially as self-revealing.Hence,
nhvis does not mean the whatness of things (Nature) butt
the essential presencing which is already inclined towards
self-closing. As a result, Heidegger may claim that,
'the never going into concealment' never falls prey
to concealment only to be dissolved in it, but
remains committed to se1f—concea1ing, because as
the never—going—into ... it is always a rising—out—
of concealment. (EGT114)
Moreover, se1f-concea1ing does not mean a mere self-
closing but a sheltering. Self-concealing is the abode (the
dwelling) in which the essential possibility of rising
(se1f-revea1ing) is preserved, i.e. rising as such belongs
to this se1f-concea1ing.°7 Metaphorica11y speaking, self-
concealing is a reservoir. On the other hand, self —
concealing has to reveal itself, i.e. tends to rise,
otherwise, it will be nothing. Therefore, self-concealing
guarantees the true nature (essence) of self-revealing , and
at the same time, se1f-concea1ing needs self-revealing.
The se1f-revea1ing and self-concealing belong to each
other. In that case, Heidegger can re-translate the
Fragment 123 in the following manner:
Rising (out of se1f-concea1ing) bestows favor upon
se1f-concea1ing. (EGT114)
Finally, we come to our conclusion: se1f-revea1ing is
at the same time a self-concealing. Then truth as
unconcea 1 men t is a ' two-foldness' ( Z 1 t) . Since this
two-foldness of truth belongs to the Same which is a simple
fold (Eini'ai t) , this simple fold unfolds itself as the two¬
fold without unfolding itself. Just as Vail s explanation:
Aletheia is the unfoldingfolding of the two-fold;
for the emergence of presencethings-present is
also the retention through ensconcement, of the
simple fold of the two-fold.
Two senses of twofoldness is announced. When the
simple fold is under consideration, it has the same
character as the twofoldness of truth. This simple fold
unfolds into the two-folds without unfolding itself and
hence, it can be seen as that which possesses the same
character as that of aletheia. The second sense is that
when truth as unconcea1 ment means that we bring something
out of their concealment and let them be seen as present,
this presence as present (being), immediately, conceals the
revealing. These two senses belong together and constitutes
the full meaning of the two—fo1dness.
c. The Notion of Trace as The Access Leading Beyond Truth
Before going into the exposition of some of the leading
notions in Heidegger's later writings, we must first
explain how Heidegger's notion of aletheia receives its
justification from etymology. The two-foldness of aletheia
arises from the privative meaning of aletheia. Lethe is
preceded by a privative. And so, Heidegger argues that
iethe, which is the oblivion of Being, belongs to the core
of a-letheia. However it is a mis-understanding if we think
that Heidegger is making use of the result of etymology to
prove the vailidity of his thesis. Although etymology may
be of help in explaning the two-foldness of aletheia,
etymology can never prove it. This is especially true in
respect of Heidegger's later writings. In The End of
Philosophy and The Task of Thinking, Heidegger once defends
himself from the mis-understanding of the usage of his
notion.
It is not for the sake of etymology that I
stubbonly translate the name aletheia as
unconeea 1 ment, taut for the .matter which must be
considered when we think adequately that which is
called Being and thinking and their belonging-
together exist. (BW388)
So Robert Bernasconi claims that,
What Heidegger was sayinq was not open to
confirmation or rejection according to such
evidence [i.e. etymology].
Although etymology cannot be used to prove the validity of
Heidegger's 1nterpretat1on, Heidegger's thesis still has
something to do with the problem of language. As a result,
Bernasconi may say that,
Heidegger's reading of a-letheia was never simply a
thesis that could have been at the level of an
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argument about language.
Bernasconi interprets Heidegger's heart-metaphor with a
Derridean notion: trace (Spur). Derrida argues that trace
is not a thing. It can neither be something present nor the
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becoming-past of what has been present. As a result,
all traces are marked unconsciously and they cannot be
presented to our consciousness. With respect to Heidegger's
ontological difference, Derrida maintains that,
differance, in a certain and very strange way, (is)
older than the ontological difference or than the
truth of Being. When it has this age it can be
called the pJay of the trace. ihe play of the
trace which no longer belongs to the horizon of
Being, but whose play transports and encloses the
meaning of Being: the play of the trace, or the
differance, which has no meaning and is no!..
Hence, how can we present to us the trace which is a past
that has never been present? Only through the language
of metaphysics can we bring forth the trace. Quoting from
Heidegger's Ho 1zwege, Derrida argues ,on the one hand, that
erasure belongs to the essence of trace because the trace
has no site and no run rk. 1 he relation between unconcea 1 men t
and concealment in Heidegger's text becomes the relation
between trace and erasure in that of Derrida. It is the
erasure which constitutes the trace as trace. The erasure
situates it [the trace] as tho chango af sito, and makes it
disappear in its appearance, makes it emerge from itself in
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its production. Therefore, erasure, a ois-trace, can be
called the 1 heart' of trace. On the other hand, Derrida
correlates the meaning of this metaphor with his conception
of the essence of language and argues that,
The erasure of the early trace of difference is
therefore the same as its tracing in the text of
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metaphysics.
Although the language of metaphysics is not in the
position to bring up the trace of the difference (in
Heidegger's words, we do not possess this kind of gramma! ),
Derrida argues that marks of some kind must be left within
the language itself, otherwise, there will be no trace or in
Heidegger's words, there will be no ontological difference.
Derrida argues:
This latter [the text of metaphysics] must have
maintained the mark of what it has lost, reserved,
put aside. The paradox of such a structure, in the
language of metaphysics, is an inversion of
metaphysical concepts, which produces the following
effect : the present becomes the sign of the sign,
the trace of the trace.... It is a trace, and a
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trace of the erasure of the trace.
Following Derrida's reading of Heidegger, it is
possible for Bernasconi to argue that,
It is only through the trace that has been left in
language that at the end of philosophy, under
conditions that we shall be exploring, the oblivion
of Being can appear as concealed in language. ...
This is particularly true of aletheia, as one of
the early words of thinking. That concealment is
iraced graphica11y when we read the wo r d as a-
letheia should not be confused with an assertion
about what Parmenides might have meant. When. we
hear the lethe in aletheia we are listening not to
Parmenides, but to the speaking of the language
itself.48
Language speaks through the marksthe traces that is
crystallized in the language of metaphysics and can only be
traced graphically. That concealment is traced
graphically does not mean that it is traced in written
signs alone. It is traced both in writings as well as
sounds. In other words, it is the play of traces that which
makes writing and speaking possible.
Now we have come closer to our conclusion. If it is
true as regards the guestion of Being that Heidegger at last
brings us to the 1 realm' which is beyond Being, then
we can maintain with the same token that the question of
truth also leads us away r rom truth. We are now confronting
the realm beyond Beingtruth, a realm to be called the
Mystery (of thought). The question remains: how can we
think of this Sameness, the simple fold, the One, or the
Mystery.
Chapter Four: Summary
So far we have explored Heideqger's notion of truth: we
notice that the notion has different significations in
Heidegger ' s .De n k s we g. In B einq and T i me , Heidegger intends
to found 1apophantical truth' (i.e. propositiona1 truth) on
'hermeneutica1 truth' (i.e. ontological truth) through the
disclosive Dasein. Aletheia is, then, understood as the
disc1osedness of authentic Dasein. Simultaneously, the two-
foldness of aletheia is explained in terms of the double
possibilities of Dasein (i.e. authenticity and
inauthenticity). In the thirti.es, in order to turn away
from the language of metaphysics (especially subjectivism),
Heidegger saves aletheia from the domination of Daseinhuman
subject. He does not interpret aletheia in terms of the
temporality of Dasein as he did in Being .and Time. He
rather thinks of aletheia as the open region which is the
'there' (da) of the truth of Being (Sein). The two-foldness
of aletheia (concealment and unconcea1 ment) is, then,
explicitly discussed under their mutual relationship.
Although Heidegger takes the first step in turning away from
the discourse of metaphysics, these two significations
remain within the discourse of special metaphysics which
analogically replaces the study of Being by the study of a
particular being, such as God, the world andor the soul.
Only when he comes to the subject matter of his thought, can
he carry out an exposition of Being in itself (i.e. general
ontology). In his own words, he thinks of Beinq without
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regards to beings ( Sein ohrie o'as sextieiitie tienken) .
Aletheia as unconcealing and immediatley concealing becomes
an access to the core subject matter of Heidegger's thought.
The way begets one; one begets two;
two begets three;
three begets the myriad creatures.
Tn fp Phi nn XI f f
The way is empty, yet use will not drain it..




Sof ten the glare;
Let your wheels move only along old ruts.
Darkly visible, it only seems as if it were there.
I know not whose son it is.
It images the forefather of God.
Tao Te China IV
The way that can be spoken of
Is not the constant way;
The name that can be named
Is not the constant name.
The nameless was the beginning of heaven and earth;
The named was the mother of the myriad creatures.
Hences always rid yourself of desires in order to
observe its secrets;
But always allow yourslef to have desires in order
to observe its manifestations.
Tao Te China I
SECT I DM THREE: BEYOND TRUTH
Chapter One: The Turn
Early in Being andTime, Heidegger has already rejected
the translation of aletheia as truth. He claims that,
Thus to the logos belongs unhiddenness — a~
letheia. To translate this word as 'truth' and
above all, to define this expression conceptually
in theoretical ways, is to cover up the meaning of
what the Greeks made 'self-evidently' basic for the
terminological use of aletheia as a pre —
philosophical way of understanding it. (ST2G2)
He revives the pre-phi1osophica1 understanding to be the
primordial meaning of aletheia. With this thematic
understanding, he opens up and lays the foundation of
philosophical understanding, or say, theoretical
understanding . In this manner, Heidegger still thinks of
aletheia in Greek way of thinking. This allows him to
retain the translation of aletheia as truth, or alvthBuien
as Being-true (Being-discover). However, in his later
writings, he leaves this kind of Greek's understanding
behind in favour of a leap into the Mystery.1 This Mystery,
which the Greeks left unthought or even intended to cover up
with theories, is now articulated by Heidegger in a even
more genuinely Greek way than was carried out by the Greeks
themselves. As a result, etymology will not help since it
ends up with the crysta1ization of the thought of those
2
earlier thinkers in the form of language. If the
crysta1ization of thought in the form of language is that
which is allowed to appear to our thought in a definite
epoch, then we can think of it through the trace of the
language of metaphysics. This has been clarified in the
last section. Now we will see how Heidegger comes to the
destiny of his thought.
In The Essence of Truth Heidegger paves the way for
his later writings. He interprets aletheia as
unconcea1 ment which lets beings be what they are, whereas
beings show themselves in an open region (ub : or;) . This
open region has a close relation with the clearing t.
L i c h t u n g) and 'the event of appropriation' ( da s t. re i g n i b ) .
These are the notions which are being emphasized in
Heidegger's later works. With the notion of open region,
Heidegger falls again into the problematic of special
metaphysics which thinks upon Being in terms of a special
being -- Dasein.4 Here, we sense a tint of foundation ism ir
this notion. On the one hand, the open region arid Lichtunc
may be seen as the realm of all realms.5 That realm is
the ground foundation of all other realms. Hence, the oper
region and Lichtung are the same as the highest realm. Or
the other hand, the open region as 'ground' means that all
beings are grounded on a particular being, i.e. Dasein. It
is different from Lichtung which is the 'ground' and, at
the same time, the non-ground (Un—grund) and the abysmal
ground (fib—grund) . Lichtung does not ground any beings as
the open region does. These notions (non—ground and the
abysmal ground) are used by Heidegger to keep us from the
seduction of foundation ism. The positive meaning of
Lichtung as 'ground' should be understood as the earth
(Boden) from which all other beings including man receive
their nutrition and stand. Hence, we should never
interpret Heidegger's notion of ground' metaphysically. As
a result, the open region and Lichtung should not be termed
as one end the seme. This gives us a clue to understand the
notion: die Lichtung.
I would first come to the notion Lichtung and then back
to Ereignis. Both of them will be analyzed in relation to
aletheia with different perspective.
Chapter fwo: The significations of Lichtung: Liehtunq as
In The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking
Heidegger explains to us the signification of the notion
Lic h tung.
We call this openness which grants a possible
1etting-appear and show Lichtung. (EPTT65)
According to Heidegger's usuage, the word Lichtung,
though having the same etymological stem as the word 'light'
( i.J CA 5::: L.. 2. C} i ( ::) , does not derives its meaning from lightening
and being lightened up. Lichtung should rather be
understood in accordance with the older words foresting'
( wa J ti Li n g) and 'fielding' ( Fo J. d u n g ) . Lichtung is a 'forest
clearing' which is experienced in contrast with a dense
forest. A clearing is a location in the midst of a forest
where trees are cleared off. Trees are being cut down in
order to let the light shines onto that region. Clearing
(Lichtung) is the opening of dense forest (Dietung). Hence,
it is possible for Heidegger to argue that Lichtung is an
opening which opens from the density (Jjicxung) . lo put it
in more vivid terms, Lichtung makes the forest free of trees
at one place (i.e. free from 'density') so that light may
shine in. Therefore, we may conclude that Lichtung has
nothing to do with the sun-metaphor. The sun is a special
being which is luminous in itself. Being itself luminous,
the sun illuminates beings other than itself and lets them
be seen by human beings as things. This way of
under standing would render Lichtung the role of a demiurge
who creates the world and its order. As we find in Plato,
the sun is the third element which binds the eye-sight and
the thing that have been seen. The sun, in this sense,
would then be the ground of the aforementioned two. This
sense of grounding as founding is being rejected by
Heidegger.
For Heidegger, Lichtung is not a third element and it
is not a being indeed. It is that which every being opens
or closes up itself. It is the realm of all realms where
every presence and absence may come to be. Hence, Lichtung
i s mo re t ha n illuminating and, also, mo re t ha n laying bare.
It is not only the brilliance, but also the openness (das
Freie) wherein everything (especially those reciprocally
related, such as gods and men) comes into shining. So light
does not creat Lichtung, it is Lichtung which opens up
foremost the possibility of lightening and being lightened.
We can not, immediately, claim that Lichtung is an
opening whic h opens up on 1 y brightness and darkness sine e i t
deals not only with the light-metaphor but also with sound-
metaphor. Lichtung also opens up sounding and diminishing
g
of sound. Hence, we should not claim that Heidegger
replaces the auditory metaphor of metaphysics with an ocular
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metaphor. For Heidegger, Lichtung stands in both metaphor
without replacing one with the other. It is rather the case
that Heidegger is here working with a primordial —
derivative' distinction. Everything other than Lichtung is
the derivative and Lichtung is the primordial. So it is
possible for Heidegger to proclaim that everything (present
and absent) is being opened up and gathered in Lichtung as
the opening. It is the topos (dwelling) from which all
things spring into being. As a result, Lichtung as the
rea1m which opens up all realms iimi±s them all. Lichtung
is not a thing (material) which acts as a limitation to all
other things, in the way a river acts as the (external)
limit of the banks. It is not the emptiest beingconcept
(theoretica1) under which other beingsconcepts are
subsumed, in the way a concept designates to an object. It
is the 'limit' which at the same time is not a limit at all.
It is not a limit because it is not a limitation Lo the
already givenness but limits beings through its own giving.
In its giving all 'limited beings' such as gods and mortals
receive their appropriate essence from which they
essentially belong. As a result, Lichtung is not a third
element which binds the related poles, since it is not a
being or a mere relation. Only if we attempted the thinking
of Being as Being without regrading beings, could Lichtung
show itself to us.°
Chapter Three: Ale t heia is The First Element _o f Lic htung
If the notion of aletheia is understood as original
(pure) presencingletting-be, is it possible for us to say
that aletheia i.s Lichtung'? Never!. Heidegger keeps warning
us that there is a Di f f re n ce between a 1 e t h e i a and Lichtung,
and hence, they can never be eguated. He proclaims that,
Lichtung is nameri with aletheia, unconcea 1ment, but
nat t! 7 auqht as such. (T B 7 0)
In the Note of On the Essence of Truth he states the same
thing :
The name of this Lichtuna is aletheia. (BW140)
How should these sentences be understood? Why does
Heidegger call the relation between Lichtung and aletheia a
relation of rarin§? The truth' of Being gives us hints.
Since aletheia is always understood as the presencing of
Being in which all beings be what they are, aletheia is 'the
possibility of any presencing as such'. Hence, I will call
it the principle' of Being (as presencing). By the word
•principle' I mean the same thing as 'condition o1
possibility'. However, the word Lichtung plays the role
as a clue, so that we can think of that which is left un-
thought or kept silence by the Greeks, i.e. the Mystery.
Lichtung is just a name, an essential name, used to show the
manifestation of the place (Space) where every presencing
and absencing occurs. Lichtung is the xpossibi1ity' which
first makes possible all possibilities of any presencing as
such . Hence, we may conclude that Lichtung is the
possibility' of the v principle' of Being as presencing. It
is the principle of principle (of Being as presencing). As
Heidegger puts it:
What prior to everything else first grants
unconcea1 ment in the path on which thinking pursues
one thing and perceives it: ha pas as tin einsx:
that presence presences. Licht u.ng gran ts i i rs t a f
ail the passibi1itv of the oth to orasanee andr .• : i
g r a n t s t ha pas s i h 1 a p res a n c i n g a f t ha t p res a n cm
itself. We must think aletheia, unconcea1 ment, as
Lichtung which first grants Being and thinking and
their presencing to and for each other. (TB68)
In short, aletheia is a notion dealing with the possibility
of any presencing and absencing whereas Lichtung is the
place' where the possibility of each presencing and
absencing is gathered together. Heidegger calls the to sno
foe movement of presencing and absencing a barter system
( e i ne h r t va n tie c hs a i w i r t s c ha f t) .
Further justification can be found in Heidegger s
dictum.
Unconcealment is, so to speak, the element in which
Being and thinking and their belonging together
exist. (TB69)
The superficial meaning of the sentence is clear. It states
Beina and thinking belong together to unconcea1 ment.
But the expression 'the element' puzzles me. Why does
Heidegger call unconcea1 ment 'the element' in addition to
the signification of the place' if unconcea1ment is being
eguated with Lichtung? This is curious. How can aletheia
be an element? Heidegger does not thematize this question
as one of his themes. In order to answer the proposed
question, we have to re-articulate Heidegger's texts and see
how the question might be attempted by him.
As we always know, an 'element' implies that which the
'element' belongs to. Then, what kind of thing is aletheia
belonged to as an element of it? Heidegger, implicitly,
gives us the solution a few paragraphs after the above cited
sen tence.
For truth [traditional sense of truth] itself, just
Being and thinking, can only be what it is in the
ejnt at Lict?tung. (1B69)
As we have exposed in section two, the traditional
conception of truth is grounded on unconcea1 ment which
prevails, the phrase the element of Lichtung should be
understood as unconcealment. Thus, we may conclude fo?
Heidegger that aletheia as unconcea1 ment is the element of
Lichtung.
Now the proposed question: why the notion the
element' is used in addition to the notion the place : is
ready to be solved. As we have shown that 'the element' is
a name for aletheia whereas 'the place' is a name for
Lichtung, the significations of these names should be
distinguished. With respect to their significations, the
former denotes the 'belonging' of aletheia which belongs to
Lichtung whereas the latter connotes the 'gathering' of
Lie htung which gathers all presencing as such. As a result,
we cannot take the element' as the same meaning of the
p1 ace' .
As we have understood, Lichtung first grants the
possibility of aletheia as the 'letting be' or 'letting-
appear' , this 1etting-appear (unconcea1 ment) in turn lets
Being and man (the one who thinks) be what they are in their
appropriated essence — be1onqinq-togetherness. As a
result, aletheia as unconcea1 ment lies between Lichtung on
the one hand and the Being of beings on the other acting as
their mdium. Aletheia as the medium has no independent
existence. It is because aletheia cannot be thought of or
a pp re he? nde?d by man if it comes to our mind without Being.
So Aletheia as presencing is the truth of Being which
happens with the disc1osedness of man. At the same time,
Lichtung can never be thought of by us if it is nor f
with aletheia which reveals and at the same time conceals.
Therefore, unconcea1 ment as the medium means its belonging
togetherness with Lichtunq and the Being of beings. As
Heidegger always puts it, they belong together to the Same
and in the Same. f hus, to .wan a .Zone, aletheia as
unconcea1 ment is called the medium and it can be seen as the
element of Lichtung. The reason is that it is man alone? who
will care about his own Being with his logos.
Then can we say that aletheia is one of the elements
that belongs to the Lichtung? No. Since Heidegger always
uses a definite article instead of an indefinite article,
this shows the uniqueness of aletheia as the element of the
Lichtung. Aletheia is unique in respect of Lichtung because
they have the same kind of essential structure (i.e.
activity) and so aletheia is the essential element of
Lichtung. As it is conceived by Heidegger, the essence
(verbal) of aletheia is an activity which reveals and at the
same time conceals whereas the essence of Lichtung is a
qiving which gives without giving itself. hurthermore,
aletheia is the condition of possibility of any presencing
and absencinq as regards Being and with respect of beings,
aletheia is the condition of possibility of any present or
absent beings whereas Lichtung is the condition of
possibility of any pure presencing. We may conclude that
aletheia is grounded on Lichtung and, at the same time, the
latter cannot show itself without the former. Just like
pure space and ecstatic time are the conditions of
possibility of all beings (present and absent) and are
grounded on the Lichtung. At the same time, without pure
space and ecstatic time, nothing is possible. Even Lichtunq
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cannot come into Being. Finally, we may come to the
conclusion that aletheia is not Lichtunq but is being
thought as Lichtung. In Heidegger's word: Lichtung is named
w i t h a 1 e t he i a .
This 'as-structure' signifies their sameness in
structure as well as their differences in signification. It
says that although the two are different, at the same time
they are the same. Aletheia and Lichtung can be brought
together because they be 1ong to each other in their active
essence. Thus, Lichtunq first opens itself as aletheia so
that Being and thinking receive their appropriate essence in
it. However, this 'as-structure' cannot not be confused
with the as'—structure in Being and Time. The as -
structure in Being and Time is explained in terms of the
hermeneutica 1 character of Dasein arid Dasein ' s ownmost
temporality is disclosed. The 'as-structure is a thematic
concept and is used to bring out the matter of Heidegqer's
thought. It can not be explained in terms of Dasein's
temporality. It rather states the tautological Difference
of aletheia and LichtungE reign is . It is that Dxrf e re : ? c e
which is being disclosed.
Chapter hour : From i lrhfnnn Fn P roin nia
In accordance with our previous analysis, we may
conclude that Lichtunq can be understood from two different
perspectives: 1 Lichtung is 'the place' where every
presencing happens; 2 it is the giving in which Being and
man receive their own essence. These two interwoven
perspectives must not be mixed up though they belong
together to the Mystery and cfaracter-ize it. This
understanding is justified in accordance with Heidegger's
usage:
The Ereiqnis of the Lichtunq is ohvsis. (EGT118)
Heidegger assimilates Ereignis and Lichtung together into
one unifying whole (the world as physis) but with different
significations. According to his usage, Lichtung signifies
the free space with emphasis on the notion the place'
whereas Ereignis signifies the giving with emphasis on the
notion 'granting as giving. As a result, Ereignis and
Lichtung can only be dissimilated according to our way of
seeing arid their difference (in signification) has nothing
to deal with their essence. Speaking in advance, their
difference (in signification) is helpful for our further
explanation on the finitude of man becasue by
thematizing their difference, it is possible for us to
articulate the full meaning of the Mystery with our everyday
language. This explains also why I put more emphasis on
the signification of the place' of Lichtung and leave the
granting' for the exposition of Ereignis.
Chaoter Five: The Sianification of Ereinn is
a. Ereionis as The 'GivinaGrantina'
We have shown in the above exposition that Heidegger
does not interpret aletheia as Truth in the sense of
metaphysics but rather as unconcea1 ment which opens up from
concealment which is its 1 heart' . Yet Heidegger does not
stop at this critical point as the Greeks does, but rather
reflects upon that which is left unthought by the Greeks.
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Then the guestion: How is presencing possible? is the
necessary one which we have to answer. This guestion leads
us to pure presencing which is named in different ways. To
emphasize its uniqueness, it is called th un, It is
called the Nystry when we try to signify its unfathomable
depth to human intelligence. In order to depict it as the
place' where everything comes and goes, we call it LXL-nLuny.
When the granting is aimed at, we call it Ereignis. if the
1 worlding ' of world (Atei ten o'er Ate i ) is highlighted it is
called th e •• o u r - f old . In respect of the possibility of
every presence and absence we call it a 1 e? t. ,-e .i a which is
two-raid. Finally, if the identity of all of the above is
under considera11on, it is called the Same (das Se1 bo) .
They are all names for the original presencinq.They all
speak the Same in terms of the Same about the Same.10
Since the question of the essence of truth (aletheia) po ?'nis
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toward Ere ignis, it is helpful to analyze the name
'Ereiqnis' in its relation to the exposed name x Lichtunq' .
h. Beinn as Ereionis
In Heidegger's later works Ereignis is one of his
central notions used to bring the Mystery into thought.
Heidegger makes an explicit claim on his usage of the
notion: Ereignis.
Today, when so much thoughtless and half-thought
matter is rushed in print any which way, it may
seem incredible to many of my readers that I have
used the word Ereignis in my manuscripts for more
than twenty-five years to indicate what is here in
my thoughts. The matter while simple in itself,
still remains difficult to think. (WL129f)
In Being and Time Ereignis means an occurrence. However,
the notion gradually finds its decisive meaning. The
translation of Ereignis as occurrence misses the point. in
I den t i ty _a nd JD i f f e renc e , Heidegger claims that,
The term Ereiqnis here no longer means what we
would other-wise call a happening, an occurrence.
It now is used as a s i n q u 1 a re? t a n t urn. What it
indicates happens only in the singular, no, not in
any number, but uniquely. (ID36)
Elsewhere he explains the relation between occurrence and
Ereignis:
One should bear in mind, however, that Ereiqnis is
not simply an occurrence, but that which makes any
occurrence possible. (TB19)
Ereiqnis is the unigue which governs occurrences. This
governing (law-like property) is neither transcendence nor
immanence. It may, at most, be treated as the condition
of possibility of presencing as such. In its giving Eyeing
and man are gathered in the appropriateness. So we can find
these words from I den tity a nd D1f f e r enc e:
Ereignis is that realm, vibrating within itself,
through which man and Being reach each other in
their nature, achieve the active nature by losing
those gualities with which metaphysics has endowed
them. (ID37)
For Heidegger, Ereignis can never be explained or
justified in terms of Being nor is it a being'. Ereignis is
indeed that very en a t. c e? r (a c. ne?) from which Being and beings-
receive their own essence. Although we cannot say Ereignis
is Being, we may see Being as Ereignis. Heidegger declares
this possible exposition .in On the Way to Language :
The matter while simple in itself, still remains
difficult to think, because thinking must first
overcome the habit of yielding to the view that we
are thinking here of Being as Ereignis. But
Ereignis is different in nature, because it is
richer than any conceivable definition of Being.
Being, however, in respect of its essential origin,
can be thought of in terms of Ereignis. (WL129f)
What, then, is Ereignis? This guestioning format is
rejected by Heidegger as early as in Being and Time because
it guest ions about the of the existence. The form
of the guestion is fallen back to the discourse of
metaphysics. Can we say Ereignis is? Never! Heidegger
warns us that,
Ereignis neither is, nor is Ereignis there. To say
the one or to say the other is egually a distortion
of the matter, just as if we wanted to derive the
source from the river. (TB24)
The meaning is clear. We can not think of Ereignis in terms
of Being but the other way round: thinking of Being as
Ereignis which is its essential origin. Ereignis is neither
Being nor being. As Derrida puts it, it neither has meaning
nor is a thing. However, if that which appears to us is in
its Being, then how we can traverse this finitude of man and
bring Ereignis to our thought remains a guestion to us.
c. Ereignis and Es Gibt
Heidegger gives us a hint to examine the guestion
through the notion 4 It gives' (Es gibt). The structure of
'It gives' is twofold: the giving and the It of the It
gives'.18 We cannot think of it in terms of another
beingBeing, but only through the giving as given which
belongs to the matter as .its peculiar property.19
Heidegger explains that,
And yet, how else are we to bring the 'It' into
view which we say when we say It gives Being' It
give time? Simply by t h 2. nk i ng t be 11 i n t be
light of tbe kind of giving oolongs to i t.? giving
as o'e.s t 1 ny ,r giving as a n opening up which rochos
out. Both belong together, in as much as the
former, destiny, lies in the latter, extending
opening up. (TB19)
Heidegger intends to think the 'It' which gives as Ereignis
which determines both Being (destiny) and time (extending)
?Q
in their belonging-togetherness. Furthermore, Ereignis
should not be thought as an 'occurrence' but only as that
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which makes any occurrence possible. Ereignis, the name
of the Mystery (or the name to indicate the subject matter
which is in Heidegger's thought) will be manifested to our
thought only when we consider Being and time in their
be 1onging-togetherness. In other words, Ereignis will come
into being with a structure (belonging-togetherness) which
determines the 'relation' of Being and time. Ereignis shows
itself as a structure. If we intend a close examination of
the Mystery, the structure and t ho s t ru c i: u ro a i o no is that
something we can come across. Thus, the question of the
meaning of Ereignis is the same as the question, What is
this the belonging-together. We first answer the
question of the signification of Ereignis
in respect of its constituents (i.e. Being and man) in their
belonging-togetherness.
As Heidegger proclaims that Ereignis as the 'It' which
gives Being is a giving which does not give itself, we,
then, may say that in its holding back it holds back its
own. Heidegger argues with the help of etymology. Ereignis
stems from the word eigen which means 'own' . This giving
which gives only its gift, but in the giving holds itself
—r
back and withdraws, is called sending . Being is the
gift sent. Since Ereignis is the giving which holds itself
back, I call this kind of giving a 'finite giving'. It is a
pure giving from which beings originate as its gift without
showing itself. This giving as sending itself is not a gift.
In the sending Being shows itself and holds itself back in
various ways with respect of man's understanding. Heidegger
calls the revealing and concealing of Being the destiny of
Being. The word 'destiny' (Gechick) has no direct relation
with fate (Schickssl), since all fates are derived from the
destiny of' Being and are the problems to human alone. The
destiny of Being in respect of human understanding is the
History of Being, i.e. the response of man in respect of the
call of Being. For Heidegger, the development of Western
civilization is the on — going response of man to the destiny
of Being. It is man alone who can reply to the call
(advent) of Being and lives within a tradition (an epoch)
and therefore, is historical.
Chapter Six: The Belonging Together of Aletheia (Wahrheit)
and Ereign is
In order to revive the primordial relation of Being and
man, Heidegger establishes a kind of harmony between Being
and man and so he argues about the be 1ongmg-togetherness of
Being and man. Hence, he proclaims that in the sending of
the 'gift' man is needed as the one who answers to it, keeps
safe of it, preserves it, i.e. lets it be and comes to last.
In so doing, the essence (iy'esen) of Being (Sein) and lasting
(wahre n) of Being can be brought into their togetherness
because they, together with truth {rh£: it) , all have a
common word—stem.
In The Anaximander Fragment Heidegger speaks of the
'relation' of 'to preserve' ( wa h re n) and truth ( Aa h r h e i i) .
In old German war (was) means protection, from which
derives all infinitive forms: wa h me hme n (to perceive),
qbwahren (to be aware of) and verwahren (to preserve).
Thus, wahren, in its original usage, means a secufing
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(protection) which clears and gathers. Since wanrfri ana
Aa h r he it have a common root wa h r (which means to keep, to
save, or to protect), it is possible for Heidegger to think
of wa h re n and Mhrhit in their togetherness - He claims
that,
Gne day we shall learn to think our exhausted word
for truth [ I ia h r h e it] in terms of the preserve; to
experience truth as the preservation IwxhrniBj of
Beinq; and to understand that, as presenting, Being
the belongs to this preservation. (EGT36)
Furthermore, in his analysis of the etymology of the
word sein, Heidegger declares that the entire range of the
inflection of the verb sein is determined by three different
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stems. They are: 1 es : that which from out of itself
stands and which moves and rest in itself — the self-
standing; and 2 bh Libhe : to emerge, to be powerful, of
itself to come to stand and remain standing; and finally,
7 fa
3 wes: to dwell, to sojourn The first stem signifies
the ownness of the truth of Being. From second stem derives
German words like hin , h is t, hi rn and b i r t, whereas from
the third stem German words like gewesen, was, war, es wesi
and wesen are derived. Since weser? acts as a constituting
elements of the signification of sein, Heidegger can argue
that weseh and .sein are the same.
Up to the very moment, we still cannot correlate w..:,;c--.-.•
and Wahrhit on the one hand and sein and weser;- on the
other. How can the two be articulated in their togethernessr
In the sense of dwelling! In Building Dwelling Thinking
Heidegger discloses the meaning of an Old High German word
baan which means to dwellto remain in a place'. By
dwelling Heidegger does not mean a mere dwelling but an
activity that man performs alongside with many other
activities, such as singing or creative working. In fact
all activities, including the mere dwelling as the
inactivated activity, are made possible only when man
dwells. Hence bauen as dwelling means the same as how far
the essence of dwelling reaches.7 So Heidegger may come
to his conclusion that,
a u e n , b u a n, b h u, b e o are our word hi n in the
versions : ic h b 2. n , I am, d u b i s t, you are, the
imperative form bis9 be. What then does ich bin
mean? The old word bauen, to which the bin belongs
answers: ich bin, du bist mean I dwell, you dwell.
The way in which you are and I am, the manner in
which we humans are on the earth, is buen,
dwelling. (BW325)
On the other hand, baue-n means to build. In German
Biidung does not mean merely construction but also
'education' . Hence, Heidegger argues that a trace is left
in the word i1dang.
Both modes of building — building as cultivating,
Latin co i e re , c u 1 i. a ra , and building as the raising
up of d i f i cbs a ad i t i ca re — are comprised within
genuine building, that is, dwelling. (BW325)
To cultivate and to raise up means to preserve and to take
care. As soon as man dwells, he is at the same time in the
position to cherish and to protect, to preserve and to take
care. Nan has to till the soil, to cultivate the vine so
that the crops may grow. Furthermore, baan and baan have
the common word-stem : bha, so we have a great certainty on
the inter-phonemic connection of wahrn, Aiahrhit and f«sen.
They are all related to the truth of Being. As a result,
Being (Sexn), in its original sense (i.e. truth, Ajahrhit,
of Being), means presencing (Ainwesenfieit) as well as lasting
(wanren) which preserves and keeps safe. Lasting should not
be understood in terms of time, i.e. duration in time. As
Heidegger conceived, lasting should be understood in
relation to a preserver who receives by perceiving, binding
and abiding in the lasting. Being is always a presencing
which presents itself towards that which receives it,
understands it. That something or someone who receives
(apprehends, Vs? rnhmen) is man. Nan receives only if he
genuinely dwells or (authentically) ek—sists.
Chapter Seven : The Constel l atigri of _ Bein(l.„and_M_an
As aformentioned, Heidegger establishes a chain of
articulated words with their word-stems. These articulated
words make it possible for him to argue for the harmony
between Being and man. That is why he can say that Being
needs man and man needs the advent of Being. Nan as the
receiver can never be the giver who gives the sending of
Being and the extending of time, because we are neither God
gods nor the transcendenta1 subject. Nor can we be a sheer
receiver who is totally passive in receiving. To be a
receiver, man is already alongside with the advent of Being
and comes to his ownmost essence, That something is being
apprehended because man can apprehend it. When that
something approaches man, he relates himself to it by taking
care of his own Being and lets the advent of Being appear to
29
him. Then, who is man? Heidegger will say that man is
the 'sherped of Being' who preserves and saveguards Being.
He is the one,
Who is concerned with and approached by presence,
who, through being thus approached, is himself
present in h1s awn way of all present and absent
beings. (TB12)
Man is first standing within the approach of Being
and then understands the Being of beings. In the
terminology of Being and1ime man is in his throwness.
Thus, Heidegger says that man belongs to Being because he is
appropriated to it. He is in the position to understand
'0
his own Being so Heidegger may claim that man needs Being.
Then why does Being needs man.-' Being needs man Decause
Being, in its original sense, is presencing which is not
incidentally present but lasting present. Therefore, Being
in order to become lasting present, needs another being so
that it can show (sem) itself there (da). Without the
receiver, Being will be Nothing as if a chess-game is
impossible to play with if there is no counter-move. It
does not matter whether this c o u. n i e r— move is either
undertaking by the only player himself or by another player
who may be or may not be a person, such as a computer.
Hence, Being needs man (another being) because it, in order
to.be present, must present itself to man through its claim
on him. Man is the openness of Lichtung who lets Being
arrive as present. As a result, we may also say that Being
belongs to man and is appropriated to it. The mutual
relationship between Being and man is that harmony conceived
by Heidegger.
To conclude, we may summarize as follows: in the ' It'
which gives, the giving as sending gives Being as its gift
together with man as the constellate of Being. Being and
man belong together to the 'It' which gives and they receive
their own essence from the It' which gives.w In
Heidegger's own words:
Man and Being appropriated to each other. They
belong to each other. (ID31-2)
Heidegger calls the belonging togetherness of Being and
man the constellation of Being and man. However, another
guestion must be raised in order to gain a full
understanding of the constellation of Being and man, that
ic: t. Wei y (,.z. )i ro uq h w h i cn a (}?!'!'!: H t can man apprehend
the advent of Being. That element is language. It is
because language is mare- than a tool that we use in
communication. It determines our way of presence.
Chapter Eight: The Essenc_e of Language
%
Heidegger dedicates a whole book to the problem of
language and in other later writings the essence of language
is one of the main themes. What, then, is the essence of
1anguage?
Language is the most 'natural' subject matter to human
beings. We are born to a particular linguistic community.
We are all familiar with our mother language without having
necessarily to know her rules and grammar. We can start our
conversation right away with anyone. When we speak, someone
will receive information by understanding the meaning of our
words. According to our ordinary understanding, language as
(human) speech is a t. oo 1 for i r 11 a ? fa i t ? Q . We take ou,
language as a means to express our thought. However, this
kind of empiricist or instrumental point of view does not
measure up with Heidegger's reflection on the essence of
language. Wilhelm von Humboldt is no doubt the first one in
modern times to take stance against this point of view.
Although Heidegqer agrees with Humboldt as regards the break
with the instrumental standpoint, he does riot follow
Humboldt to define the essence of language as nrgeict which
is being understood after Leibniz's monadology as the
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activity of the subject.1- I his Humboldtian conception of
language will subsume lanquage under a general notion,
efie rye i a, as one of its special case.
Heidegqer aqrees with Humboldt on his deep dark
—r—r
insights into the nature of language,00 that is, the
transformation of language. Heidegger writes,
We know that the possibility of an innate
transformation of language entered Wilhelm von
Humboldt's sphere of thought, from a passage in his
treatise on The Diversity of the Structure of
Human Language (WL136)
How is the transformation of language to be understood?
There is a difference between Humboldt's conception of
language and that of Heidegger. For Humboldt, the
transformation is an innate one. Man can alter the language
without altering the language as regards its sounds and
even less its form and 1 aws. °4 Through tine, new meaning
will be introduced to language by the development of
ideas.35 This is done so by an inner 11 1 uminat ion' force
[Kraft] of mankind, i.e. energeia. And so, it is called an
innate transformation. But for Heidegger, the
transformation of language does not lead to anything under
which language is subsumed. His conception of
transformation is a going back to the original sense of
language itself. That is, Heidegger intends to re-discover
the essence of language. Language as informative tools is
now changed into language as Saying which shows. The
.essence of language has been transformed from human capacity
to the appropriating nature of language.06
It is because language is more than a tool for
communication, language determines our way of presence and
any presencing as such. While interpreting Stefan George's
Words, Heidegger exposes the relation between words
(language as names) and things. In the final stanza, the
poet writes,
So I renounced and sadly see:
Where word breaks off no thing may be. (WL140)
Heidegger maintains that the poet does not treat language as
name — giving which depicts the already present. fhe poei0
rather states this:
It is the word which first ha I as the treasure in
its presence, indeed just fetches and brings it
there and present it. Suddenly the word shows a
different, a higher rule. It is no longer just a
name — giving grasp reaching for what is present and
already portrayed, it is not only a means of
portraying what lies before us. On the contrarv,
the word fi.rst bastaws presence, that is Being in
which things appear as beings. (WL.1.46)
It is not the case that our language should correspond to
things, but rather that all things should come to be in
accordance with our language. The relationship between
1anguaqe and things is that of structuring rather than that
of denotating. Heidegger thematizes this relationship with
an old German word tie Feeinonis. It means that it is the
word which first lets a thing be as a thing. Hence,
Heidegger the thinker claims along with the poet that with
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the absence of the word, the treasure disappears.
Following this line of thought, we can at most reject
the instrumenta1 ist definition of the essence of language.
But there still remains the threat of falling back to
subjectivism as did Humboldt. To conclusively disclose the
essence of language, Heidegger explains in terms of
renounced.
Heidegger declares that renouncing is not a stating.
It belongs to the verb 'to forgive'. The opposite of vto
forgive' is 'to accuse'. Since accusing means to allow
something to be seen, it says the same thing as showing. In
old German there is a word which has the same meaning. ihis
is sagan which means 'to say' and from which derives words
like 'Saga'. Hence renouncing means to give up [to
forgive] the claim to something C to say].'3j As a resulc.
renouncing is a mo fine r of Saying which is a refusal to
say. This refusal is called renunication (das Ve rz .1 c h t) by
Heidegger. However, Heidegger does not think of
renunication in a negative manner but rather in a positive
way. He proclaims that,
This renunciation is a genuine renunciation, not
just a rejection of Saying, not a ere lapse into
siionoo. As self-denial, renunciation remains
Saying. (WL147)
Finally, we are coming closer to the relation between
renunciation and Saying. The poetHeidegger as the thinker,
who experiences the renunication once, brings the
renunication into his saying in the form of self-denial
which concerns words and things. As the denying,
Renunciation is in itself a Saying: self-denial ...
namely denying to oneself the claim to something.
(WL150)
While the poet still has to spear of his expenecne of
renunciation in a nogoi.ivo mo.nnor (i.e. refuse to say) on
the one hand, renunciation, on the other hand, may call a
non-denial of one self. It is because renunclation,
although remains science (a manner of Saying), has to come
into being in Saying, otherwise, renunciation would be
nothing but absolute silence. Thus, Heidegger claims that,
in this nondenia1 of self, renunciation says itself as that
kind of Saying which owes itself wholly to the mystei y of
the word. ' This two-foldness of renunciation belongs
together to Saying which shows. The Saying which shows,
i.e. Showing, is the essence of language
What, then, is the significance of experiencing that
renunciation? For Heidegger, this leads him to the
possibility of the transformation of language. He writes,
The renunciation thus learned is no mere refusal of
a claim, but rather t he t ra ns fa rm t i a n a f S'a y i n q
into the echo of an inexpressible? Saying whoso
sauna is ha re1y porcoptiilo and songlike. (WL150)
Here a transformation of language takes place. Through
the guestion of the Being (Essence) of language, we are able
to point towards the language of Being (essence) which is
the Saying which shows. For Heidegger, the essence of
language is an unfathomable depth in respect of human
intellect and speech. ht. most, we can see it as a song.
The language of Being, in Heidegger's thought, means the
song of Ere? ignis. This song of Ereignis as Saying which
shows comes into being when someone is listening to the
Saying. If not, Saying can never be the Saying but solely
an absolute Silence. As we have learnt from Heidegger, it
is man, the mortal, who possesses a distinguished ability to
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encounter and answer Saying. As a result, for
Heidegger, language appears to have two significations. In
the broad sense of the word, it is the language ot Being and
in the narrow sense, it is human speech. That is why he
could say that,
Ereignis, needing and using man's appropriations,
allows, Saying to reach (human)speech. (WL129)
Only in so far as man belongs to the Saying, is he listening
to the Saying. This role of listening Heidegger signifies
as 1 apprehension' . By way of apprehension, man allows
something be said to him and re-told again yet in another
way than that in which he has experienced from the Saying.
It is done so when,
We let its soundless voice (Saying) come to us, and
then demand, reach out and call for the sound thai
is already kept ins to re for us. (WL124)
In human speech there prevails the Saying as Showing which
lets the present be appeared and the absent be faded. At
the same time, this appearing and fading are re-told with
with our lore: ion and pram war (i.e. our speech). Language as
Saying which shows sturctures the way of presencing and the
openness of Lie htung into structure. Hence, in ihe Way to
Language Heidegger makes the following claims:
Language speaks in that it, as showing, reaching
into all regions of presences, summons from them
whatever is present to appear and to fade. (WL124)
Elsewhere we read,
Saying pervades and structures the openness of that
Lichtung which every appearance must seek out and
every disappearance must leave behind, and .in which
every present and absent being must show, say,
announce itself. (WL126)
Only i( Saying as showing structures the openness of
Lichtung, can the mortal soul come to his speech. It
happens because traces, in Derrida'5 words, are marked
within our speech. As a result, Heidegger may sum up that:
For, since the being of language, as Saying that
shows, rests on Ereignis which makes us human over
to the r£?l£jc;is7)ent in which we can listen
freely, theref ore the way mak ing a f S'ay-ing inta
speech first opens up far us the paths along which
a u t h i n k i n g ca n p t rs ue t he a u i ha n t i c: wa y t a
1 a ? p 'J. a go . (WL130)
Further justification can be found in an alteration of
a published text done by Heidegger himself. In The
Principle of Identity Heidegger writes,
Language is the most delicate and thus the most
susceptible vibration holding everything within the
suspended structure of Ereignis. We [man] dwell in
Ereignis in asmusch as our active nature (wesen) is
given over to language. (ID38)
Joan Stambaugh, the translator, takes noticed that Heidegger
amends his text by altering the word and thus into
but also. This small but significant change shows the
relation between language and the constellation of Being and
man in Heidegger's later works. For Heidegger, language
does not first receive its own Essence which is suitable
for holding everything within the suspended structure of
Ereignis. By the alteration, Heidegger shows his intention
to think of language as Saying on the one hand and Ereignis
as the vibrating realm on the other in their sameness.
That is why Heidegger could say that the being of language,
Saying that shows, rests on Ereignis in the former
citationAs a result, Heidegger proclaims that,
In Ereignis vibrates the active nature (wesen) of
what speaks as language, which at one time was
called the house of Being. (ID39)
In his early writing language is called 1 the house of
Being'. That name can be explained more explicitly in
accordance with his later ideas. It is not to be thought as
a Structuring while Being exists independently of the
Structure as a portablecalculable object (being),
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structures itself and fits into the Structure of Language.
It should be seen as the dwelling place where Being can come
into its manifestation with the apprehension of man. Only
in language can man apprehend the advent of Being and only
through language can Being be manifest and thought. Hence,
language may be called t he men i a t :i n g e 1 Erne n t of Being and
man .
After the exposition of the constellation of Being and
man through the essence of language, we may claim that
Being and man differ not in nature but in perspective. By
'nature' I mean the same thing as essence (verbal). It is
because of this difference in perspective that the three
belong together as a whole and each of them can never be
explained in terms of the other two. They are articulated
with each other and are indivisible.
Chapter Nine: The Three f old n ess o f Be i onq incj -together
Aiter the exposition of the constituents of the notion
be 1onqinq —together , we must analyze the signification of
the notion in itself in order to have an appropriate
understanding of the notion. There is three forms of
be 1onging —together . It may act as i the relation of man
and Being, or of Being and thinking (i.e. belong together);
and 2 the relation between Ereignis and the constellation
of Being and man (i.e. the be 1onging — together) ; and finally,
3 the name of Ereignis (i.e. the be 1onging-toqethernesB) .
In The Principle of Identity Heideqqer gives us his
interpretation on Parmenides' Fragment: To gar auto neein
tin to kai eiiai.. In accordance with his earlier
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interpretation in Introduction to Metaphysics, he argues
that noein should never be explained in terms of a thinking
which perceives. To translate it as perceiving is to
relate ourselves with a knowing subject who posits all
beings within his net work of relation. Heidegger declares
that it is better to translate it as apprehension'
( T'ernehrnen) . The translation of nooin as apprehension has
nothing to deal with epistemo1ogy. It intends to bring
forth the facticity of man as the there' in which the
advent of Being can come to presence. Man is never a
subject who wills himself by making use of his own will
(i.e. a will to will)'7 leaving the ontological difference
(between Being and beings, such as, man) remains unthought.
Deification of man is resulted. In order to overcome this
crisis, Heidegger tends to bring the ontological difference
into thought and places thinking and Being back to where
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they are rooted. Hence, despite their difference,
Heidegger intends to think of Being and man in their
4 Q
belonging together. They belong together to the Same.
This Sameness as belonging-togetherness is called
Ereignis. Hence, there is a Difference between Ereignis
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and the appropriated elements.w The opening up of the
Difference as the 'difference' is significant to us. It
indicates the only possibility of representing to ourselves
the 'difference' through aletheia as the medium of Ereignis
and Being. These two forms of be1onging-together have
already been exposed in the above exposition. It is the
third form which needs further explanation.
Except being used as the constellation between Being
and man and a 1 so as the Difference, be 1onging~togetherness
may also be used as the na me? t o ::: ha ra c t e? r-ize the hystery .
By the word ' cha rcte? r-i z mg , I do not mean dominating or
determining. There is no relation of domination in between.
In respect of their power, it is rather the powerless' one
deter mines the more powerful one. fhe powerless is in
the position of determining because it gives birth to every
beings in their Being. At the same time the powerless' is
of no power because it does not give any concrete materials,
such as a chair, but only the giving itself. In Heidegger's
thought this kind of determining' is a bringing out' . It
brings something which hides itself from us out of its
hiddenness. How can man (in Heidegger's terms, a finite ek.~
sistent) do so? By giving a name to the Mystery, man has
called it to our mind. By using a substitute ( i.e. a name)
we bring the Mystery to our understanding and appear to us
in their un hiddenness. Ereignis is the na?e, so is Lichtunq
and aletheia. Heidegger gives us his word:
We can give a name to the Ereignis that prevails in
Saying: It — Ereignis — appropriates or owns.
(WL128)
For Heidegger, Ereignis is a name indicating the Mystery of
thought. Further explication of the signification of the
notion name will be found in the following chapter.
Chapter Ten: Erejqn1s: The Name of Name
What do we mean to say that Ereignis is a name? Does
it means the same as the arbitrary relationship between a
name and its named object which is portable and calculable,
such as J-particle and the experimental result? (I call
this kind of name a mere name). Or does it name the Essence
of the named object (i.e. the Essence of the named object is
grounded on the name) for instance, the necessary
relationship between the logos of the Creator and the
created world? (I call this a holy name).b Neither the
former nor the latter is qualified to explain the meaninq of
the word name that 1 am, here, using because they are
grouded on the 'name-object' model which is an empiricist or
instrumental standpoint. Ereignis is not a mere name
because the subject matter which the name pointed towards is
not an object of empirical space-time. The named object is
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not an object of scientific research, which is
mathematical and representational in Essence. And,
therefore, it is not a calculable or re-presentable object.
Ereignis is not a holy name as well. It is because the
subject matter which is pointed towards by the name is not a
created thing which is grounded on the logos of the Creator.
Both of them will lead to the same consequence of deifying
human nature in different directions.
The former will conclude that althouqh the knowing
subject (man) cannot represent to himself the real object,
the subject is able to introduce a substitution by his own
power. By name-giving, the subject substitutes trie
representation of the real object with a name that is
offered by the subject himself. Hence, the subject is not
living in a world of real objects' but 'a world of mere
names . Since the name and the named objected is not
necessarily articulated , the connection between 'the world
in which he is living' and 'the world of real objects'
remained arbitrary or undetermined. The 'two' worlds are
totally disconnected. The latter differs with the former by
asserting man's finitude the same time the ability of human
will is enhanced. The latter concludes that although the
knowing subject is distinguished from the object being
known, the subject can represent to himself the real object
through the names which are being given by the divine. The
divine mind guarantees that man is living in reality. As a
result, he is not living in a world of substitution, i.e.
mere names, but in 'a world of reality'.
However, these two approaches presuppose the subject —
object' dichotomy which in turn is related to a
correspondence theory of knowledge. They assert that either
the representation known by the subject is identical with
the presentation of the object in the latter case, or, in
the former, the relation between representation and
represented object is arbitrary. If Ereignis is not a mere
name or a holy name, then what kind of signification should
Ereignis as a name carry? We cannot answer the guestion
in a positive manner because any positive solution will mean
that we could reach the Final Truth. As a result, we
could only speak .in a negative manner and claim that
Ereignis is a name but it is not a mere name or a holy name
because the notion Ereignis as a name' is made possible
only on condition that man is finite but he is not totally
passive. Ereignis is just a name because man is being
called and, in the calling, there must be something
addressing us even though we might not know what it is. If
it is not the case, it is impossible for us to raise any
names. It is not a holy name because, in his passivity, man
prepares himself for the apprehension of Being and preserves
his spontaneity. This explains why Heidegger says that man
is the 1sherped of Being'. In his awaiting man is the only
being who possesses the ability to apprehend the adventcall
of Being so that all beings can come into their Being. In
the terminology of Being and lime, it is because man is the
only being who will care about his own Being, it is possible
for him to apprehend the call of Being. Further
justification can be obtained from Heidegger s notion of
language. As we have noted that the song of Ereignis needs
human speech in order to come to presence. For human speech
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is the sound that is already kept in store for usw as our
lexicon and grammar , as a result, for Heidegger, iinn
i. 171. l e s.r 'i a a c c no same time? inr in ite . Man is a finite being
in respect of the advent of Being. He is, at the same time,
an infinite being because, in his own essence, he lets the
advent of Being appear to us. Throughout his Bonkswag,
Heidegger does not abandon this theme (the finitude of man)
and so, in his early writing, we could find that Dasein, in
its thrownness, is transcendence. Hence, the passivity (i.e
thrownness) and spontaneity (i.e. transcendence) together
define the meaning of the finitude of man. In his
spontaneity, man offers himself a name in order to bring out
the call of the Mystery.
ur previous analysis of the three forms of 'belonging-
toegether' has already presupposed the possibility of a
syn thetic unity (of these forms), otherwise, it is
impossible to dissimilate the notion. Hence, we may speak
for Heidegger and claim that the three belong together to
the Same. Or in a Heideggerian way of speaking, aii farms
of belonging togot nor ho long together in their bo longing
taget ho moss. Does this sentence mean something such as A
is A', i.e.- a tautology? We will leave the question
unanswered for a moment and will return to it later.
Chapter Eleven : The Be1onoinQ-together of The Place' and
the 'Granting' Through The Notion of _P 1 ay
We have differentiated the two constituents of the nm
Ereignis: the one which qives (It) and the giving. It
is the right time for us to explain how they can be
assimilated into unity. Can Heidegger again distinguish
them with a 1 primordial-derivative' model as we find in
Being and Time? Certainly not, for this would mean that the
%It' is prior to the giving or the vice versa. On the other
hand, the primordial one is not permitted to be derived from
the derivative one. This will be a self-contradiction and
will not be accepted by Heidegger because of its falling
back to a 1 substance-attribute' model (a model of
metaphysics). The primordial one will gain the sense of a
substance which is the ultimate reality and Truth whereas
the derivative one will become an attribute of that
substance. With this explanation, we will go back to a
1 substance-attribute' model in the sense of Essentia1 ism.
This kind of Essentia1 ism, which treats the Essence as a
static (or without ciyntxrn :i c) one and the Essence can be
reached in its full nature, is the one which Heidegger
intends to get rid of.
How, then, can we able to comprehend the It and the
(giving' as one? Am I asking appropriately? No. Anything
which can be united has already presupposed their
distinctivness. Thus, we can at most say that the two are
combined together. However, Heidegger does not intend to
think of the combined matters as unity. For Heidegger,
their distinctivness are grounded on our undertaking
aRfl4 ysis « 4 £3 4 4 thic, kind wf qidtinc tivncss.the
'analytical distinctivness'. Without human mind which
analyzes according to different themes, there will be no
analytical distinctivness. Thus, it is better to
transfigure our guestion : How can the One be seen as twef?
The trace of ploughing cannot be found except we are
ploughing. If trace is being found, we know that the ground
has been ploughed. This daily example gives us a clue to
answer the proposed guestion. On the one hand, in the
giving alone could we find the giving place (It). On the
other hand, the 'giving must occur within a location and so
there must be a giving place (It) which may or may not be a
substantial being. Further examples may help. Let us
imagine that we are powerless but imaginating. We want to
visit Disney land, the land of fantasy but we are being
prohibited. With our imagination, we can create' a
substitution for ourselves. If we want to play football, we
can have our 'football-field' by positing the goals. If we
want to play 'the police and the thief , we could play the
game by running without positing signs (such as the goals).
As we all know that the one who is running in the front is
the thief and the one behind him is the police. In our
running, not only the playground is being established, but
aiso our role in the game we are involved.5
As a result, for Heidegger, the 'It' and the 'giving'
speak the same thing. In order to present itself, the
'giving' will show itself as something spatial, i.e, the one
which gives (It), whereas the one which gives as spatial
existence never gains its independence from the giving as
the temporal. The 'It' cannot be thought of without the
'giving' . Hence, the one which gives (It) and the 'giving'
just like the a rc h i — space and a re h i -1 i m e are no t ye t
something which is spatial-temporal existence. All spatial-
temporal existences are possible only when the arch.i-space
and archi-time are in their essential belonging-
togetherness. This is the reason why Heidegger always calls
Ereignis the vibrating realm. It does not mean that the
realm possesses some kind of vibration, but only tho t i ?n
in it. so If is - v i b r a t.n q a no .is cho vibv a l ion .llso.i. .
However, by making use of the concept of playing as the
clue to the explication of be 1onging-togetherness of the one
which gives (It) and the giving, it seems to be justifiable
to ask who is playing. Here I am in debtee! to Hans-Georg
Gadamer in answering the proposed guestion. Gadamer gives a
sound attack on this kind of subjectism which is
psycho 1ogica11y and anthropo1ogica11y centered.56 Gadamer
argues that although the player knows very well what a game
is and what he is doing is just a game', he does not know
what he exactly 1 knows' in his knowing, such as, the rules
of the game. A player is the one who always follows the
rules without knowing the rules consciously. As a result,
Gadamer argues that the intention of players cannot be seen
as the essence of play.
The player are not the subjects of play; instead,
play merely reaches presentation through the
p1ayers. (TM92)
Man is the player of the game as long as he plays.
Provided the knight moves in accordance with the rules of
the chess-game, the knight will be a knight of the game.
It is not the case that we first become a player and then we
intend to play one of the games as our playing game. It is
rather the game which determines the player to be the player
who plays that game. Hence, Gadamer breaks away with
subjectism as well as teleology which is grounded on the
players intention. This notion of play departs with
subjectism when the player is not the centersubject of
play. Qn the other hand, it breaks away with teleology when
i t does not tie to the player s intention. In other words,
playing does not tie itself to an end. The essence of play
(game) must be reached from a way other than these two. In
the examination of our daily usage of the word 'play',
Gadamer traces the original meaning of the word from its
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transferred meaning, such as 'the play of light', 'the
inter-play of limbs' and even 'a play on words'. The
essence of play is,
The ta anti fra movement which is not tied to any
goal which could bring it to an end. (TM93)
The breaking away with teleology has nothing to deal with
dis-order or chaos. It is because while we are playinq, the
Sg
game (play) will represent to itself an order in which the
to-and-fro movement of play follows. Since we have at the
same time broken away with subjectism, the to-and-fro motion
of play happens by itself and happens without a mind or an
agent. As Gadamer puts it, the movement is without
effort.b9 As a result, the notion of play cannot be
challenged from the perspective of subjectism and that ot
teleology. All players have to be involved within the game
and to follow the rules of the game, otherwise, they are not
players or they are not playing.
The expasition of Gadamer s notion of play fulfills two
tasks. It gives reply to the challenge and gives way to our
further explication of the notion Ereignis. In
Truth and Method, Gadamer introduces an important
methodological conclusion.60 He argues that so far as man
lives, he plays naturally. Man is the player who plays
thehis greatest game the world—game. The world as
Nature (original emergence, physio) , is mobile in essence.
This mobile form of Nature, that is, the to-and-fro motion,
has the same meaning as playing. So Gadamer concludes that,
Nature, in as much as it is without purpose or
i n i e n t i o n , as it is, without exertion, a c:o no i a n 11 y
se1f renowing play, can appear as a model of art.
(TM94)
This conception of Nature as physio is originated from
the Greek Ontology as well as Heidegger's notion of Ereignis
as physio. In his later writing which calls The
Principle of Ground Heidegger expresses the notion of
Ereignis as physio through a poem,
The rose is without why: it
blooms because it blooms
It cares not for itself, asks not
., .,, 62if it s seen.
The word 4 because' {wB.il) can never be understood as
'reason' which is an answer to the why-question. fhis
explanation contradicts with the word 'without why' which
means that the opening of nature cannot be explained by
human who gives reasons to himself as the explanation.
'Because' when it is understood together with without why'
.intend to bring the essence of physis into our thought.
Because which analogically means the zig-zag way of human
thought is the to—and fro motion of the phvsi which opens
up so that every being may persist. However, the guestion
why physis opens and opens up in this or that direction can
never be explained by human beings. Although the essence of
man is to understand Being and at the same time to let
beings be, he is not in the position to explain that
opening. Hence, physis, in Heidegger's thought, is kept off
from any teleological explanations and the intention of
a conscious subject. Its opening is without effort' and
'without why' .
Through the notion of play, we have explicated
Heidegger's notion of the essence of Ereignis as physis is,
play. And now it is clear why man, who possesses reason, is
helpless in explaining the world he is living. It is
because the world in its essence' cannot be made known to
us through our faculty of reasoning. This is the destiny of
human being. This is the finitude of man.
What does Heaven ever say? Yet there are the four
seasons going round and there are the hundred
things coming into being. What does Heaven ever
say?
Confucius, The Analects
While standing by a river, the Master said, What
passes away is, perhaps, like this. Day and night
it never lets up.
Confucius, The Analects
there is a thing confusedly formed,
Born before heaven and earth.
Silent and void
It stands alone and does not change,
Goes round and does not weary.
It is capable of being the mother of the world.
I know not its name
So I style it 'the way'.
I give it the makeshift name of 'the great'.
Being great, it is further described as receding,
Receding, it is described as far away,
Beina far awav. it l dpsrn hpri a c; turninn h a r- k _—'w. « .A. r f V-I w- w. w r m
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SECTION FOUR: CONCLUDING REMARKS
I. As we have seen, aletheia is on the one hand the
first element given by the giving of 'the one which gives'
(It). On the other hand, aletheia is that opening which
makes possible any present beings in their Being. In that
case, we may argue that aletheia is the link between
Ereignis and Being. Ereignis does not give Being as its
immediate effect. It is aletheia which opens up the
possibility of any pure presencing as such. Ereiqnis
unfolds itself as aletheia which in turn lets all beings
appear in their Being. Conseguent1y, we may conclude that
these three terms in fact refer to the very same issue in
respect of Heidegger's thinking. It is only when considered
from different view points and in different contexts that
this same issue receives different, names.
As a result, from a tautological point of veiw, the
thinking which thinks upon Being is a thinking which thinks
of aletheia. At the same time, the thinking which thinks of
aletheia means to think of the truth of Being which needs
human Da~sein as the 'there' (da) for its showing. Hence,
the thinking which reflects upon the be 1onging — togetherness
of Being and aletheia is the same as a thinking which
reflects upon the constellation of Being and man. It is
that belonging-togetherness as Ereignis which grants the
possibility of presencing as such. In general, Ereignis is
that 1 relation-giving' which makes relation in general
possible. We may call it the 'relation' of all relations.
Since the giving does not give itself in the giving but only
the be 1onging-together of Being and man, I call it a finite
giving which gives without showing itself.
Finally, the thinking which reflects upon Being is a
thinking which thinks hyond Being. This dictum is
applicable to the thinking which reflects upon truth. By
the phrase thinks beyond Being' I do not mean to think upon
a realm other than Being that exists in itself (i.e. as a
counter part of the possible realm of Being). The word
'beyond' cannot be explained in common terms and the phrase
does not imply any differences between the realm of Being on
the one hand and one beyond it on the other. If it is not
understood proporly, the project of Heidegger is doomed to
be misunderstood in accordance with traditional
metaphysicsLogic. The realm beyond Being will then be
taken as the realm of Non —BeingNothing (metaphysical 1y) and
this would imply that Non-Being can appear to our reason.
But this undertaking is far from Heidegger's conception of
'beyond' . Our finitude keeps us away from this kind of
thinking although the history of metaphysics shows us that
we might think metaphysc1a 11y. Since man is the animal
which possesses language and can bring being in its Being
through language. Being appears to us either as the Being of
being or as the Being of non-being. Man is condemned to
live in a world of beings such that we could at most
represent to ourselves the Being of non-beings. In
Heidegger's words this is the throwness of man. Non-being
means the same thing as 'absence of beingsno — things . It
is not the Non-Being in itself. Hence, the 'Highost Peak'
we could reach remains within the realm of Being. If it is
possible for us to represent to ourselves the realm ooyono
Being, then that 'realm' must show itself in respect of
Being, otherwise, it would be nothing toy . As a result,
our remark needs further qua 1ification: in order co think
byond Being, we must think of Being and remain dwelling
within the realm of Being alone. Through the highest Being,
we receive an image (i.e. Non- Being) of the realm beyond
Being, i.e. Non-Being.
II. If the finitude of man prohibits man's ability of
r eat, hing the realm of N on — Being, then how can we traverse
the 'Difference' (between Ereignis and Being) and take a
leap from Being into Ereignis which is not a being? Our
power of substituting ability may be of help in bringing the
Mystery into sight.
Language which is image-making in essence constitutes
the genuine meaning of the finitude of man. In spite of
man's thrownness, he is able to understand the Unknowable
Unreachable by giving a namesign to it. In the name-giving
he could bring the Unknowable into Being through his speech.
Now, the Unkownable bears the name in-knowab1e which means
something we cannot know with our reasoning. As Heidegger
exposed, human language (iegein) is a 'bringing-out and a
letting-be that gathers'. It has the same essence with
physib (the original presencing). Human language and physxs
are the same in essential structure, but they differ in
their onto-cosmo1ogica I status. Thus, we may say that human
speech is an image of physis, the song of Ereignis. We
could make use of a substitute or an image (i.e. a name
which is given by the name-giving activity), to bring the
unfathomable depth (the Mystery) to our understanding. With
the help of names, we have brought it into Being.
'Ereiqnis', 1Lichtung' and even 'the Mystery' are the
namesthematic concepts that we use to get hold of the
Mystery and to get beyond Beingtruth.
Hence, Ereignis is neither a holy name nor a mere name.
These two approaches would create the illusion that either
man knows the Mystery (which is out of his reach) by a name
or man can know the Mystery which is constituted by man
himself alone through a mere imaging of it. But it is the
facticity of human being that he is neither God nor a
demiurge. Any attempt which tries to get beyond Being by
deifying human nature would fail and fall back into the
realm which they have tried to escape. Since the essence of
our language and physis as the Mystery are the same,
4 Ereignis' as the name of the Mystery can be called an
essential name. The thinking which thinks of the Mystery
through an essential name is a thinking which thinks within
the realm of Being. It is still possible for us to think
byonti Being when we keep ourselves in the realm of Being.
In other words, unless we remains finite, we can no t get.
beyond Being. To get beyond Beingtruth means to get
bovand the finitude of man within his finite possibility.
III. In order to disclose the possibility of taking a
leap from the realm of Being to the realm beyond it, we
have to differentiate between two forms of analysis: 1 the
first — order analysis and 2 ! the second order analysis. The
former is that kind of analysis to which the original
subject matter (Ur-sache) belongs essentially. This
original subject matter is the Mystery. The latter is that
expas i t ion to which the name of the Mystery belongs
essentially. I call this 'the primitive distinction' in
contrast with 'the primordial distinction' which is a
distinction differentiated within the second-order analysis
alone. The constituents of the primordial distinction are:
1 the name.? of the Mystery and 2 the belonging-
togetherness of Being and man. These distinctions are
important because they have shown the finitude of man and
the possiblility for Heidegger to name the Mystery
'analogically' and at the same time essentially . By
making use of the primordial distinction which belongs to
and possesses the same structure of the primitive one,
Heidegger can shorn the primitive distinction thf ough its own
imago, the primordial one. 1 his image is not an
arbitrarymere image but an ess e ntia I one because the 2ma go
of the Mystery is the produ.ci of the Mystery as the giving
which gives. Since that imago comes from the granting of
the Mystery, they are alike. On the other hand, although
the iHcige is the generation of the Mystery, it is a being
other than the Mystery. We can explain this further with
the help of an example. Although the father is the one who
gives birth to his child, he is different from his child.
1 his further explains why 'Ereignis' is an essential name of
the Mystery but not a mere name as a sheer analogy or a holy
name. It also explains the meaning of the fimtude of man.
Man is incapable of reaching the first-order analysis. We
could, at most, stay within the second-order and see it as
the 'first-order analysis'.
IV. In the present paper, we have come across the word
'tautology' several times leaving it unexplained. It is the
right time to explain the usage and the signification of
this notion in Heidegger's text.
In The Principle of Identity Heidegger begins his
lecture by thinking upon the tautological formulation, such
as v a = A' or 'the plant is the plant'. They all speak of
'tautology' (Heidegger calls it the Sameness) in a form of
tautology. For Heidegger, the thinking which reflects upon
tautology in a tautological way does not mean thinking of
nothing and saying nothing. In Heidegger's word, it rather
10 1 1 s GVErything. This wby of thinking which r6lGB50s us
from metaphysical thinking indeed tells us something which
is simple but significant. Hence, tautology' can never be
understood as it is defined in Formal Logic, but rather as
the unfathomable depth (when the ni'tt.£?r of our thinking is
emphasized) or the finitude of man (when the essence of our
thinking is emphasized). In a seminar held in 1973,
Heidegger finally comes to the latest re-formulation of his
thought.
The Thinking which we are now inquiring into I call
tautological Thinking. This is the original sense
of phenomenology.
Tautological thinking is neither a metaphysical
thinking nor a phenomeno1ogica1 thinking. The essence of
tautological thinking is hermeneutica 1 in nature. By the
word hermeneutic', I do not mean the hermeneutic of Basem.
which is determined by the language of Beingand Time.
Here, 'hermeneutic' signifies the de-coding of the tidings
of that message [the call of Being].3 Hermeneutic is now
related to the call of Being. That which is being made
explicit is the message of Being and man lives within the
advent of Being.
The subject matter of tautological Thinking (i.e. the
Sameness) is that original matter (Ur-sache) which is at the
same time the subject matter of our thought. Since the
matter which gives birth to every possible being is itself
not a being. Hence, we could not think of it as we do in
scientific research. In order to bring the matter into
thought, we have to i s our own thinking from its
representationa1 mode. Heidegger calls this kind of
releasement a step back'renunciation. As a result, we
could at most think upon the tautology (the matter)
tauto1ogica 13y. This makes Heidegger possible to re¬
formulate his question in tautological forms such as,
Ereignis ereignet (Ereignis appropriates). Saying this, we
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say the Same in terms of the Same about the Same.
The signification of Heidegger's tautological thinking
is always being misunderstood by novices. Since the matter
of tautological thinking is the Sameness, people may think
that the thinking which thinks tauto 1ogica 11y upon the same
matter is not thinking at all, and is indeed useless and
non—pragmatic. They may even appeal to Heidegger s texts,
such as The Principle of Identity and identify Heidegger's
mode of thought with that of rnisology. They argue that
tautological thinking cannot give rise to sciences (or say,
knowledge in general) because that thinking has demolished
the ground of the methodology of science (i.e.
classification). Scientific research in the first place has
to distinguish its object from other realm of discourse so
that the identity of its object can be maintained throughout
the experiment. On the one hand, classification of
scientific method presupposes the differences among
empirical objects as its coorelate. On the other hand, the
differences of objects in trun has to presuppose the
manifestation of beings. As they argue that it is the
latter which is being guestioned by Heidegger. In their
opinions, Heidegger takes a different standpoint than that
of Kant. For Kant, he grounds the differences of empirical
objects (as empirical realities) on human capacity so that
all sciences may develop. Heidegger, who goes on the other
track, assimiltes all differences into unity and takes those
differences as derivate in respect of the Sameness. All
(empirical) differences are ruled out from the tautological
thinking except the tautological Difference (or say,
Gntological Difference in the broadest sense). Hence, they
conclude that Heidegger's tautological thinking denies the
essence of science (i.e. technology) as well as the
possibility of human civilization and the thinking which
goes back to the origin is a thinking which draws human
being back to the chaos.
However, they have misunderstood Heidegger's thought
because it is not his intention to put man back to the
chaos. The task of his work is to revive the genuine
meaninq of articulation which is the ground of all sciences.
Only if Heidegger insists that the only possible task of man
is to await the call of Being, can this criticism justify.
Although Heidegger puts particular emphasis on Dasein in his
Bar Iier works and on the call of Being in his later works,
he nevertheless admits the autonomy of human reason.
Moreover, this criticism remains hasty for it will
unconsciously draw the distinction between an early
Heidegger and a late Heidegger rendering these two phases of
thought imcompatible. Yet, if our exposition of the
autonomy of human reason in respect of the call of Being can
stand, then we can at most say that Heidegger, in his later
years, tells us too little about that subject. Here, I am
in debted to Bernasconi who has cleared up the puzzle in my
thought. He has guoted a few sentences from John Sal lis toi
explain the possible relation between the early and later
work of Heidegger:
Here it is a matter not simply of change from the
text Being and Time, but rather of an immanent,
i.e. radicalizing critigue set upon bringing into
the open something already in play,
inconspicuously, perhaps even concealedly, in
Being and Time itself.
If John Sal lis is right (and 1 think he is right), then we
should re—consider Being and 1 ime in respect of Heidegger s
later ideas. From this re - reading of Being and ,_Tjl me., there
may be a possible way out of the threat of misoloqy. It
might not generate any scientific knowledge in the empirical
sense, but it lays the foundation of all sciences.
The task of re-reading Being and Time cannot be carried
out in this paper, since it reguires us to re-articulate
these notions of Being and Time and that of Heidegger's
later writings. In the present paper, I only rasise the?
guestion and will leave it to further effort in the future.
Although Heidegger is determined to break away from
Essentialism in the form of foundationism, Heidegger remains
to the last analysis an essen11a 1ist. As we have seen from
our previous exposition, Heidegger intends to bring forth
the mat1er of thought so that the maiter can be thought by
us. In order to finish his task, he looks for a name to
des ign a t.e t r ac e the ma 1ter. As a result, the name of the
matter is explained in terms of a name-reality' model. The
matter is the reality, the ultimate reality. All beings
come into presence within the self — manifestation of that
reality. And hence, everything belongs to this essence of
all essences as its gifts. Heidegger who accepts this mode
of thought remains an essentia 1 ist. Derrida proves that
such is the case in his exposition of The Anaximander
Fragment . In that essay, Heidegger states that:
The relation to what is present that rules in the
essence of presencmg itself is a unique one,
a 1togehter incomparable to any other relation. It
belongs to the uniqueness of Being itself.
Therefore, in order to name the essential nature
of Being, language would have to find a single
word, the unique word. From this we can gather how
daring every thoughtful word addressed to Being is.
Nevertheless such daring is not impossible, since
Being speaks always and everywhere throughout
1anquaqe.
For Derrida there remains a trace of metaphysics in The
Anaximander Fragment. Here Heidegger is asking for the
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proper word and the unique name. At this point, I find it
worthwhile to make this remark: Heidegger does not hold a
misoloqical point of view because he is an essentia1ist.
V. In the present section, the term 'finitude of man'
becomes the leading notion. All the above remarks are
possible only on the condition that this notion is
c1 a rified.
In the history of philosophy the issue ot human
finitude has been overshadowed by two kinds of
interpretation. They understand the finitude of man either
from the position of God or from the essence (in the sense
of human capacity [ l-'eroger)] ) of man but these are all
irrelevant. In the farmer case the autonomy of human reason
has been eliminated by Nature and man is seen merely as one
of the created being. He is given a real world by his
creator. On the other hand the latter has deified the
position of man whose essence cannot have a definite
determination. The finitude of man can never be determined
solely from eternal source (such as, God) or solely from
inner source (such as, will). To speak in a Heideggerian
way, the finitude of man should be determined according to
the belonging-togetherness of that which gives his birth and
his activity. The essence of man is determined from two
origins. They are: 1 Being as presencmg and 2 the
active apprehension of the call of Being. In respect of the
presencing of Being, man is a finite being, whereas in
relation to the self-motivation of human intellect, man is
in-finite. We may cddc 1 lj.gg- that within the f initude of man,
man possesses an infinite possibility of self-determination.
This is the truth of the finitude of man. 1 his is what we
have iea rnt from such a thoughtful thinker as Martin
Heidegger.
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1ABSTRACT
In the present paper, I would like to analye the notion
of truth in Heidegger's later works in respect of the
finitude of man as follows:
1. Correspondence theory of Truth and coherence theory
of Truth have the same level of meaning for Heidegger
because they are grounded on a 'proposition- fact'
structure. However, Heidegger argues with the empiricist
that the proposition is not the 'locus' of Truth (which is
merely of derivative sense). At the same time, Heidegger
differentiates his work from that of the empiricist on the
epistemological dispute on the problem of truth.
2. 1etheia(unconcea1ment) is understood as the
meditating elements of Ereignis and Being. If it is not the
case, we cannot explain some relation-words (such as,
'points toward' or 'as') used by Heidegger to indicate the
relation between Ereignis (the event of appropriation) and
Being.
3. Ereignis and Lichtung (Clearing) are the
names of the Mystery. Heidegger always claims that these
names are just provisional words however, his intended
meaning cannot be explained in crystal-clear terms until we
have analyzed his problem of the finitude of man with it.
-rk,n=m name are the essential ones in contrast with holy
name (which brings the Essence of the Mystery without
mediation) and mere name (which takes the Mystery merely as
a name constituted by human alone). They are the essential
names because they are imagers of the Mystery which is image-
making (or in Heidegger's words, the Mystery is a giving).
They have the same kind of essential structures or
activities because they have the same structure as the
Mystery.
4. Finally, the problem of the finitude of man is the
latest reflection in the present paper. Although man is a
finite being in respect of his thrownness, the finitude of
man can never be explained by God or by man himself alone.
Heidegger will not accept the consguences of these
interpretations because they have suppressed the spontaneity
of man in relation to God on the one hand or on the other
hand enhanced the human will to the role of God s Will. In
the former, we will not take it as man s finitude but his
facticity whereas, for the latter, man becomes god and the
god of all beings. As a result, for Heidegger, human
finitude should be explained in terms of his origin and his
essence in their mutual relation. Man is the receiver ot
the advent of Being while, in his apprehension, he prepares
himself as the place for the manifestation of Being. In so
doing, man turns to be a qe?nui he- man.


